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A detailed program covering all phases of reliability for 
a communication satellite was presented. In long mission programs 
such as this one, reliability is the prime consideration in assuring 
a successful accomplishment of the stringent goals set forth. Reli-
ability principles and methods were incorporated in delineating each 
major task in the program. These principles and methods not only 
aided the reliability personnel in performing their duties better, 
but also assisted the design group, manufacturing personnel, and 
the testing and evaluation group in performing their jobs efficiently 
by being aware and knowledgeable of reliability engineering. 
Various reliability disciplines were imposed, as requirements, 
on the different groups assigned to the high reliability program. 
As each group in the program organization became aware of the many 
problems encountered in this type of program, the reliability personnel 
worked with each one, incorporating the methods and controls of 
reliability. These methods and controls aided the design group in 
designing a system with reliability as the prime consideration. The 
manufacturing personnel received training and indoctrination instructions 
in reliability practices, thus enabling them to build a system at the 
highest level of reliability. The testing and evaluation group used 
reliability and statistical analysis techniques in their testing 
programs to check out the design and manufacturing of the satellite. 
The results and accomplishments speak for themselves. Checking 
the record to date shows a very successful phase of communications 
byway of satellite. The feasibility of satellite communications 
has been proven and the future for more sophisticated techniques 
looks excellent. 
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Communication by means of satellite has come of age. A decade 
ago this method of communicating was not feasible basically because 
of the severe requirements imposed on the various electronic components. 
Parts were needed that could last for many years without maintenance. 
Our technology had not advanced that far at that time. Another way 
of putting it: the methods and techniques of obtaining high reliable 
components for the satellite were not fully developed. This paper 
presents one way of designing, manufacturing, and testing a communi-
cation satellite, with reliability being the primary objective. 
Chapter 1 is concerned with the historical background of 
communication satellites, detailing the progress achieved since 
the first successful launching of Score in December, 1958. Also 
discussed in this chapter are the merits of passive communication 
satellites and active communication satellites. Reliability was 
introduced at this point to establish the necessary goals in 
achieving a communication satellite of high reliability for mission 
times of up to 5 years. 
Reliability was the main concern during the stages of design. 
This was accomplished by setting up an organization with the 
reliability function as one of the main disciplines. A reliability 
program was set up specifically to monitor and control all aspects 
of the reliability tasks. Such tasks as reliability analysis and 
assessments; control of processes, material, and parts; reliability 
control of suppliers; failure reporting, analysis, and corrective 
action feedback of all failures; reliability indoctrination and 
training; reliability testing programs; and program review are 
covered in some detail in Chapters 3 and 4. 
In Chapter 5 are the conclusions, findings, and recommendations 
of the reliability program developed for the communication satellite 
system. These conclusions and recommendations are based on present 
state-of-the-art techniques and methods. 
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CHAPTER 1  
HISTORY AND INTRODUCTION 
OF COMMUNICATION SATELLITES  
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
In this fast moving and complex world we live in today, the 
need for long distance, real-time communications has developed. One 
solution to this problem is the use of a communication satellite. To 
this end the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, in 1959, 
initiated a program developing the technology and feasibility of such 
a system. 
Passive Communication Satellites  
Earth satellites could either be passive or active. The passive 
satellites are orbiting reflectors that return a signal from a trans-
mitter on the primary body. The most common configuration used is the 
balloon. Examples of the passive satellites are the Echo I, Echo II 
(Rebound), and West Ford. 
Echo I is a 100-foot diameter balloon made of aluminized plastic 
film (Mylar) only 0.005 inches thick. It was launched into orbit on 
August 12, 1960, The important significance of Echo I was it proved 
that it was practical to reflect two-way telephone conversations by 
using a manmade passive satellite. It also confirmed the design 
requirements for future ground stations and that satellite tracking 
by the use of radar and telescope was very reliable. 
2 
The Echo II was launched from the Pacific Missile Range on 
January 25, 1964. The satellite had a novel controlled inflation and 
pressurization system. This came about because it was indicated in 
the Echo I configuration that the balloon had not been pressurized 
significantly to remove the wrinkles from the skin surface. This 
increase in pressure provided a great improvement in balloon sphericity 
and RF reflectivity characteristics. It should be noted that during 
this time a cooperative experimental program was implemented between 
the USSR and the U.S. The USSR supplied the U.S. the results of their 
optical and photographic observations from Soviet sites taken in the 
early life of Echo II. 
The last type of passive satellite is the West Ford which was 
conceived in 1959. It was originated and developed by Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory. The satellite was made 
up of a belt of millions of hair-thin orbiting reflective "needles". 
It was successfully launched in the summer of 1963 with the following 
results noted: 
. A few of these belts could provide worldwide, reliable, low 
data rate communications almost immune from physical 
destruction. 
. Predictions of non-interference with radio astronomy were 
valid. 
. The method used of dispensing a belt of millions of tiny fine 
wires was workable and feasible. 
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Active Communication Satellites  
The other type of satellite being used for communications is the 
active type. The active satellites receive and amplify a signal before 
retransmitting it to the ground. There is therefore some electronics 
involved in the configuration of these active satellites. 
The first active communications satellite was Score, standing for 
"Signal Communications by Orbiting Relay Equipment". It was launched 
on December 18, 1958 with the capability of real-time relay of voice, 
code and teletype. Although short lived, only 13 days, it demonstrated 
its capabilities extremely well. The satellite was powered by battery, 
being the most feasible in 1958. 
Another active satellite was the Army Signal Corps' Courier I-B. 
It was launched on October 1i, 1960 being powered by 20,000 solar cells. 
The electronic package consisted of four receivers, four transmitters, 
and five tape recorders. In this way signals were received from the 
ground, stored on the tapes and transmitted back to the ground at a 
later time. It transmitted some 118 million words during its active 
but short life (only 17 days in orbit). 
Telstar I, proposed by the Bell System in 1960, was another type 
of active satellite used for communications. It was launched into an 
elliptical orbit on July 10, 1962 having an apogee of 3503 miles and 
a perigee of 593 miles. It weighed only 170 pounds and had a 34 inch 
diameter. 
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The following objectives were the reason for the Telstar project: 
. To prove that a broadband communications satellite could be 
used to relay telephone messages, data, and television programs. 
. To measure the radiation that the satellite encountered while 
in space. 
. To test the electronic equipment used in the communications 
satellite under launch and space stresses. 
. To find the most efficient means to track the satellite 
accurately. 
. To provide life test for the antennas and other ground station 
equipment. 
The satellite performed more than 300 technical tests all with 
successful results. The electronic equipment performed just as it was 
expected, encountering no damage from vibration or shock during the 
launch phase. The only unexpected thing that was encountered was the 
extreme manmade radiation levels in space. These were estimated to be 
more than 100 times than expected. As a result the transistors in the 
command circuit encountered difficulties. The malfunctioning satellite 
was diagnosed from the ground and successfully commanded back "on". 
This was a first in space communications. 
On May 7, 1963 Telstar II was launched into an elliptical orbit 
having an apogee of 6713 miles and a perigee of 604 miles. The higher 
altitude (almost twice that of Telstar I) provided Telstar II with 
longer visibility periods at the ground station in Andover, Maine and 
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several ground stations in Europe. Most important it kept the satellite 
out of the high radiation regions of space for a much longer time. 
The major differences in Telstar I and Telstar II were the 
following: 
• Telstar II had a greater range of sensitivity when radiation 
measurements were taken. 
. Six new measurements were taken and reported back to earth. 
. Telemetry could be sent on both the microwave beacon and on 
the 136 megahertz beacon. 
. Telstar II used different types of transistors in the command 
decoder circuit, one from which the gasses had been removed 
from the cap enclosures that surround the elements of the 
transistor. In this instance we see where reliability is an 
over-riding consideration in satellite design to provide longer 
life by proper choice of components. 
Relay I was another in the series of active communication 
satellites. It was launched by NASA on December 13, 1962 and provided 
the first satellite communications link between the United States and 
South America, Japan, Germany, and Scandinavia. Relay I was designed 
to receive and transmit one television broadcast or 12 simultaneous 
two-way telephone conversations. It used nickel-cadmium storage 
batteries charged by more than 800 solar cells. Each satellite had 
two transponders delivering 10 watts each. The transponders consisted 
of a receiving, amplifying, and transmitting system. 
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Relay I was successful in carrying live television broadcasts 
between the United States and Europe and continued to operate for 
more than twice its design life of 1 year. This is another example 
of designing a reliable satellite and using reliability and all its 
important considerations in the program for long life electronics. 
Relay II was launched on January 21, 1964. It was modified 
basically to improve its reliability and increase its resistance to 
radiation damage. It performed its intended function and experiments 
were conducted until September 26, 1965. 
The Syncom Project was an undertaking in the field of active 
communications satellites that started with the launching of Syncom I 
on February 14, 1963. The objective was to place active repeater 
satellites into synchronous orbit. 
There were two advantages of a synchronous satellite. The first 
advantage of synchronous orbits is that fewer satellites are needed to 
cover most of the earth's surface. The second advantage is that simpler 
ground stations are needed, despite its greater distance from the earth. 
Since low altitude satellites move very fast through the field 
of view of the ground station, two antennas were needed for uninter-
rupted service, one to track the satellite and the other ready to 
acquire the next satellite as it comes into the field of view. These 
very large antennas had bandwidths of 0.1 degree. Using and pointing 
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these large antennas with their narrow bandwidth beams at fast moving 
satellites was not an easy assignment. The equipment used during this 
operation was very expensive. 
Synchronous satellites, like the Syncom series of active commun-
ications satellites, were quite satisfactorily used with nearly fixed 
antennas. 
The Syncom satellites carried within their structure an apogee 
kick rocket motor. This motor added the capabilities of the existing 
launching vehicle to place the 75-pound satellite in a near synchronous 
orbit. Additional propulsion subsystems must perform to successfully 
complete the intended mission. 
As was mentioned previously, the first experimental Syncom 
satellite, Syncom I, was launched on February 14, 1963. Its peak 
altitude was approximately 22,300 statute miles. After the on-board 
rocket was fired, all signals ceased. Up to this point, however, the 
communications equipment functioned satisfactorily. It was established 
at a later time that Syncom I achieved a 33° inclined orbit with a 
period of almost 24 hours. 
Syncom II, launched on July 26, 1963, achieved first successful 
synchronous orbit with full spacecraft capability. It had many "firsts" 
to its credit. Among them were: 
. Provided first television, voice, and facsimile experience 
with a satellite in 24 hour orbit. 
. Became the first satellite maneuvered to a specific longitude 
(55° West). 
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. Period and attitude control was achieved for the first time 
in order to station Syncom II and provided the world with 
demonstrations between North America, Europe, and Africa. 
• Carried first telephone conference between heads of state via 
satellite. 
. The first press conference was successfully completed by using 
the Syncom II communication facilities in 1963. 
In addition to these achievements Syncom II supplied useful data 
to scientifically determine the shape of the earth and to learn more 
about drift behaviour of synchronous satellites. Accurate observations 
were made of anomalies in the earth's gravitational field. It was also 
learned that it took less energy to keep a synchronous satellite on 
station than was originally surmised. 
Syncom III was launched on August 19, 1964. It was the first 
attempt to place a satellite in geostationary orbit. The ground track 
of a geostationary satellite is a point instead of a figure 8. Zero 
inclination of Syncom III was possible by using the Thrust Augmented 
Delta (TAD). This was a more powerful X-258 third stage with the thrust 
of the second hydrogen peroxide spacecraft control system. 
Syncom III provided increased capability for maneuvering and station 
keeping. Also greater radiation protection and longer useful life 
expectancy was realized by shielding the solar cells with 12 mil glass. 
A summary of the space communication satellite projects is given 
in Table 1.1. 
LAUNCH DATA INITIAL ORBITAL DATA 











Score 12/18/58 ETR Atlas B 8750 101.5 115 914 32.3 Decayed, 1/21/59; 
first comsat, 
transmitted messages 
for 13 days. 
Echo I 8/12/60 ETR Delta 166 118.2 941 1,052 47.2 In orbit, first 
passive comsat; 
relayed voice and 
TV signals. 
Courier 1B 10/4/60 ETR Thor-Able 
Star 








Relay I 12/13/62 ETR Delta 172 185.9 819 4,612 47.5 In orbit; comsat, 
experiments con-
ducted until 2/65. 
Syncom I 2/14/63 ETR Delta 86 1426.6 21,195 22,953 33.5 In orbit; communi-
cation lost at 
orbital injection. 





INITIAL ORBITAL DATA 















Syncom II 7/26/63 ETR Delta 86 1454.0 22,062 22,750 33.1 In orbit; synchron-
ous comsat over 
Indian Ocean, used 
by DOD. 




Echo II 1/25/64 WTR Thor-Agena B 547 108.8 642 816 81.5 In orbit, passive 
comsat, first joint 
program with USSR. 
Syncom III 8/19/64 ETR TAD 86 1436.2 22,164 22,312 0.1 In orbit; synchron-
ous comsat at 180°W. 
Early Bird 
Intelsat I 
4/6/65 ETR TAD 85 1436.4 21, 748 22,733 0.1 In orbit; commercial 
communication service 
initiated 6/28/65. 
IDCSP-1 6/16/66 ETR Titan IIIC 100 1334.7 20,923 21,053 0.1 In orbit; one of 7 
initial defense 
communication satellites.
TABLE 1.1 Continued 10
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IDCSP-3 6/16/66 ETR Titan IIIC 100 1336.6 20,936 21,088 0.1 In orbit; initial 
defense comsat. 
IDCSP-4 6/16/66 ETR Titan IIIC 100 1340.8 20,935 21,194 0.0 In orbit; initial 
defense comsat. 
IDCSP-5 6/16/66 ETR Titan IIIC 100 1344.0 20,949 21,258 0.1 In orbit; initial 
defense comsat. 
IDCSP-6 6/16/66 ETR Titan IIIC 100 1338.6 20,936 21,139 0.2 In orbit; initial 
defense comsat. 




10/26/66 ETR TAD 192 730.1 2,088 23,014 17.2 In orbit; active 
comsat, 12 hour 
orbit rather than 
planned 24 hour 
orbit. 








LAUNCH DATA INITIAL ORBITAL DATA 










DEGREES  STATUS  
IDCSP-8 1/18/67 ETR Titan IIIC 100 1330.0 20,835 21,038 0.1 In orbit; initial 
defense comsat. 
IDCSP-9 1/18/67 ETR Titan IIIC 100 1331.0 20,854 21,031 0.0 In orbit; initial 
defense comsat. 
IDCSP-10 
1/18/67 ETR Titan IIIC 100 1332,0 20,867 21,036 0.0 In orbit; initial 
defense comsat. 
IDCSP-11 1/18/67 ETR Titan IIIC 100 1333.0 20,875 21,063 0.0 In orbit; initial 
defense comsat. 
IDCSP-12 1/18/67 ETR Titan IIIC 100 1335.0 20,901 21,089 0.0 In orbit; initial 
defense comsat. 
IDCSP-13 1/18/67 ETR Titan IIIC 100 1337.0 20,923 21,128 0.1 In orbit; initial 
defense comsat. 
IDCSP-14 1/18/67 ETR Titan IIIC 100 1340.0 20,932 21,192 0.1 In orbit; initial 
defense comsat. 
IDCSP-15 1/18/67 ETR Titan IIIC 100 1343.0 20,935 21,275 0,0 In orbit; initial 
defense comsat. 




TABLE 1.1 Continued 
ETR = Eastern Test Range 
WTR = Western Test Range 




INTRODUCTORY REMARKS  
We now come to the main subject of this paper: Reliability. Just 
what is reliability? Webster defines reliability as being suitable or 
fit to be relied on, trustworthy, honesty. These are all in the category 
of abstract concepts. In the engineering world and in mathematical 
statistics, reliability has a real and exact meaning. In its simplest 
and general form, reliability is a probability of success. Stated in 
formal terms: Reliability is the probability of performing without  
failure a specified function under given conditions for a specified 
period of time. 
Reliability is viewed as one of the essential engineering 
technologies and is characterized as concerning itself with: 
. The probability of performance over a specified period of time. 
. The analysis of available strength against probable stress. 
. The trade-off of reliability against other qualities that are 
desired. 
. The cost needed to achieve the given reliability goal. 
. The optimum usefulness of the product after it has been sent 
into service. 
Military reliability considerations have become very important in 
the last ten years. With increasingly wide use of electronic equipment 
and its growing complexity reliability found its way into every phase 
of the concept, design, development, manufacturing, test, and delivery 
cycle. By 1952 the Research and Development Board of the Department 
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of Defense had created an Advisory Group on the Reliability of 
Electronic Equipment. As a result of their studies the reliability 
activity grew and culminated in the 1957 AGREE report, on the work of 
nine task groups in the Reliability of Electronic Equipment. 
Reliability becomes an ever-increasing factor in the military 
business. The main specifications and documents listed in the 
bibliography are an indication of the importance of reliability 
requirements. 
In the design of communication satellites, reliability is a most 
important consideration. In order for the system, using satellites for 
communications, not to become prohibitively expensive the satellite has 
to be extremely reliable, with a lifetime of at least one year or more. 
Presently for space electronics used in communication satellites, the 
term long life connotes mean-time-to-failures or mean-time-between 
failures (MTBF) of at least five years. 
For a typical communication satellite the following reliability 
requirements will have to be met. 
. The mission time - ten years. 
. The probability of success - at least 50%. 
. The Mean-Time-Between Failure, MTBF - 5,250 days or 
approximately 1,916,250 hours. 
. The number of discrete electronic components - 2500 to 5000. 
. The average failure rate per part - 1.6 x 10-9 to 3.2 x 10-9. 
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These reliability requirements will have to be achieved by 
designing reliability into the communication satellite system. By 
proper selection of component parts, by use of redundancy in certain 
sections of the electronics package, and by having a tight control on 
manufacturing, testing, failure reporting, training of personnel, it is 
then possible to achieve the reliability for a successful satellite system. 
Before delineating on the main tasks of reliability to assure a 
reliable satellite let's describe in detail the advantages and disadvan-
tages of some of the satellite systems mentioned in the previous section. 
When considering the advantages and disadvantages of the different 
communication satellite systems, there are certain points which should be 
remembered. First, distinction must be made between a disadvantage that is 
relative in nature and a disadvantage of a system that might prevent the 
satellite from operating satisfactorily. Thus if the satellite system was 
of the synchronous orbit type, the station keeping equipment would be more 
complex thus reducing the reliability (which is of prime importance in long 
life communication satellites). The launch weight would be greater and a 
more powerful vehicle would be required to launch the satellite. Looking 
at it from another point of view, ground station antenna costs are reduced 
considerably, tracking requirements are lessened, fewer satellites are 
needed to cover the same area, and that of knowing where the next satellite 
will appear is reduced. Thus only a complete analysis will tell if one type 
of system is better than another. All of the factors must be examined 
thoroughly and weighed against the attributes of other competing systems. 
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If several satellite systems are feasible a decision must be made 
as to which one should be chosen. There are a few criteria in making 
the selection. They are: 
. Location in the radio spectrum of the bands of frequencies needed 
for the proposed service. Usually the transmit frequency bands 
are different from the receiver frequency bands. 
. The required bandwidth needed to transmit and receive 
communication messages. 
. Any interference that might be encountered to the system, thus 
not providing the optimum requirements for communications. 
• The cost of building such a satellite system. 
. Obtaining approval for frequency allocations. 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Passive Satellites  
As we recall passive satellites are metallized spheres that reflect 
ground radio signals from one point to another ground point. There are 
no active parts in the passive satellite and therefore the signal is not 
amplified in anyway. Some of the important advantages of passive 
satellite systems offered are as follows: 
. Simplicity and reliability because, as mentioned above, there are 
no active components in the system. 
. Satellite stabilization is not a requirement unless the system 
uses a reflector that is directive. 
. Since the satellites are linear, they are broad-bandwidth devices 
and can be used at various power levels and frequencies without 
problems in cross-talk. 
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. The feasibility of such a satellite system has been demonstrated, 
as in Projects Echo and West Ford. 
. The required payload weight is very modest. 
. The satellite cannot cause any radio interference once it becomes 
obsolete. 
. By adding terminal facilities new channels can be added thus 
increasing the flexibility of the system. 
. Changes in the state-of-the-art can be made even if the satellite 
is in orbit. These changes might be a change in frequency, increase 
in power, and use of different modulation techniques. 
The disadvantages or limitations of a passive satellite system are: 
. The need for high transmitter power for isotropic designs, 
usually ranging from 10 kilowatts to 10 megawatts. This high 
power is likely to cause interference to other services, due to 
antenna and side-lobe radiation and radiation of harmonic power. 
. The signals received are not amplified in any way in the process 
of being reflected from the sphere or balloon. 
. The returned signals will fluctuate unless the sphere is rigid. 
. The maximum range at which the passive satellite can be used is 
restricted due to the poor signal-to-noise ratio at the altitudes 
at which the satellite is placed in orbit. 
. The large size makes it very susceptible to puncture and to 
orbital deviation due to radiation pressure. 
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Advantages and Disadvantages of Active Satellites  
Recalling that active satellites are complex electronic devices 
capable of receiving a signal, amplifying it, and returning it to the 
ground (this is an instantaneous repeater) or storing it and returning it 
at a different location (this is a delayed repeater), let us discuss some 
of the advantages and limitations of this device. 
The advantages may be stated as follows: 
. Smaller ground antennas and transmitter powers can be used, as 
compared to the passive satellite system. The power requirements 
are usually 1 kilowatt or less. This low power reduces the 
interference to other services from antenna side lobes and 
harmonic radiation. 
. The signal-to-noise ratio is adequate for high-altitude orbits. 
Some limitations or disadvantages of active satellites are as 
follows: 
. Once the satellite is in orbit, state-of-the-art changes cannot 
be made in the improvement of system characteristics. 
. The equipment used is more complex, thus giving a satellite system 
which is inherently less reliable than a passive satellite system. 
Due to this complexity more effort in design and development is 
required to achieve long lifetimes (usually five years or more) 
for the satellite. 
. There are limitations on the power supplies and transmitter power 
in the satellite for the time being. This will improve as larger 
payloads become possible, and as nuclear power sources become available. 
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. In order not to be a source of interference, the satellite 
system must be destroyed or its transmission terminated once it 
becomes obsolete. 
. Antenna stabilization would be needed to minimize any fluctuation 
of signals. 
. The satellite might be susceptible to interference from high-power 
ground sources such as radars. 
. To transmit and receive a message over a long distance, say 
45,000 miles (from earth to satellite and back), involves a 
time lag of about 0.55 seconds. This delay is very annoying 
and makes two-way conversation difficult. Figure 1.1 shows the 
time delay which will be present in space systems. 
In the chapters to follow attention will be given to every phase 
and task deemed necessary for reliability considerations in designing, 
building, and launching a successful communication satellite. First 
of all let us talk about the problem we are faced with. We begin this 
in the next chapter by giving a statement of the problem. 
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FIGURE 1.1 Communication Time Lag 
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CHAPTER 2  
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
As can be seen from the discussion in Chapter 1 and by reviewing 
Table 1.1, Space Log of Communication Satellites, a very large percentage 
of satellites that were launched were successful and as a matter of fact 
still operating perfectly. The questions now are asked: Why have there 
been so many successful communications satellites? Was it just a matter 
of chance? On the contrary: It was no accident that caused a very suc-
cessful phase in communication by means of satellite. It could be stated 
in just one simple phrase: Reliability was the prime consideration from 
initial system concept, through manufacturing and testing, and finally 
into launch and orbit. 
How does one go about implementing a reliability program for a 
communication satellite to be reasonably confident that the satellite 
will perform its mission satisfactorily for periods in excess of 3 years? 
This then is the problem that we are faced with. 
The rest of this chapter will discuss in some detail the necessary 
reliability considerations and tasks needed to obtain a communication 
satellite that must be extremely reliable. 
Bell Telephone Laboratories have developed a numerical procedure for 
predicting the mean time to failure of complex electromechanical systems. 
For instance, in designing a 2 hour synchronous communication satellite, 
the mean time before failure of 1.5 years was calculated. If the satellite, 
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whose orbit control had to last for only 30 days, a mean time before 
failure of 1.8 years is possible. This would be the case for satellites 
in a polar orbit. A theoretical mean time before failure of 3 years 
would be required for uncontrolled active satellites. 
High reliability in a communication satellite requires intensive 
planning during its design and construction. Reliability must be con-
sidered during the initial design studies and continued throughout the 
entire program. Reliability cannot be overlooked until the testing program 
is started in hopes that testing will improve the system reliability. One 
very important fact must be stated at this point: Reliability cannot be 
tested into a system, it must be designed in very early in the program. 
In obtaining a high reliable communication satellite certain 
approaches must be followed: 
. Reliability must be pursued in every phase of the program as an 
end in itself. 
. Components used in the system must be used at a small fraction 
of the designed or rated capacity. This is known as derating. 
. Wide design margins must be used in all subsystems when 
considering environmental conditions and operating parameters. 
. Consider the use of redundant components or units which will 
offer the highest potential for increasing the overall reliability. 
Redundancy is the existence of more than one way for doing a given 
task where a system failure is defined only if all the ways to 
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perform the given task have failed. We will discuss redundancy 
and types of redundant configurations under the task of 
reliability assessments, apportionment, and analysis. 
▪ All phases of the mechanical design and fabrication must be 
understood and designed with adequate margins. 
. The testing program must be performed at three levels - 
component, subsystem, and system. 
At this point a review will be made of a system description and some 
of the requirements for a typical communication satellite system in order 
to point out the characteristics of not only the satellite itself but also 
of the ground station from which full communications capacity is obtained. 
The review will consider one of the project Syncom satellites. This project 
was assigned the synchronous orbit, active repeater satellite investigations. 
The advanced Syncom, or Syncom II has a voice communication capacity 
of 600 two-way telephone conversations for each of the transponders in 
the satellite. The Syncom II system had four transponders, giving a total 
capability of 2400 two-way telephone channels. The system was also 
capable of providing television or other wide-bandwidth signals, using 
the same transponders. The solar cells which were used for electrical 
power provided the satellite with 135 watts. 
The communications requirements for the Syncom II are as follows: 
Capacity: The satellite should be designed to accommodate 600 
two-way telephone channels or one monochrome or color television station 
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in each of the four frequency bands. The 600 telephone channels could 
start from as many as 100 ground station terminals simultaneously and 
should accommodate multiplexed teletype signals. 
Quality: The communication links should be of such quality so 
as to exceed the standards set by the International Radio Consultative 
Committee (CCIR) of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). 
Table 2.1 lists the characteristics of the ground station for 
which the full communications capacity is achieved. 
Transmitter (For Each Frequency Assignment)  
Saturated Power 	 10 kilowatts 
Frequency Band 	 6 gigahertz 
Bandwidth 	 25 megahertz 
Diplexer Loss 	 -1 db 
Frequency Stability 	 1 part in 1010 for short term 
1 part in 107 for long term 
Antenna  
Diameter 	 85 feet 
Efficiency (receiving and 
transmitting) 	 54 percent 
Receiver  
Noise temperature (all sources 
including antenna) 	 80°K 
TABLE 2.1 Characteristics of Ground Station 
The standards used for the Syncom II are given in Table 2.2. 
Television Signal-to-Noise Ratio 
Peak-to-peak signal to weighted 
noise 	 51 db 
Television Video Bandwidth 
Monochrome 	 4 megahertz 
Color 	 4.5 megahertz 
Voice Channels  
Test tone/noise ratio 	 50 db 
Total channel bandwidth 	 4 kilohertz 
Voice portion of bandwidth 	 3.1 kilohertz 
Multiplexed Teletype Signals  
Maximum error in frequency 	2 hertz 
TABLE 2.2 Standards for Communication System 
The signal and noise levels for the system at several points are 
given in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. It should be noted that these parameters 
are for the system when used for monochrome television signals. 
Transmitter Power 	 33.0 dbw 
Diplexer Loss 	 -1.0 db 
Ground Antenna Gain 	 62.1 db 
Space Attenuation 	 -200.8 db 
Receiver Antenna Gain 	 8.0 db 
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Off Beam Center Allowance 	 -1.5 db 
Receiver Carrier Power 	 -101.2 dbw 
Receiver Noise Power Density 	-195.3 dbw/hertz 
Receiver Noise Bandwidth 	 74.0 db 
Receiver Noise Power 	 -121.3 dbw 
Carrier/Noise Ratio 	 20.1 db 
TABLE 2.3 Frequency Modulation (TV),  Ground to Spacecraft 
Spacecraft Transmitter Power 	6 dbw 
Diplexer and Phase Shifter 
Losses 	 -3 db 
Spacecraft Antenna Gain 	 18 db 
Space Attenuation 	 -197.1 db 
Off Beam Center Allowance 	 2 db 
Ground Antenna Gain 	 58.4 db 
Receiver Carrier Power 	 -119.7 db 
Receiver Noise Power Density 
(80°K) -209.6 dbw/hertz 
Receiver Bandwidth 	 74.0 db 
Receiver Noise Power 	 -135.6 dbw 
Carrier/Noise Ratio 	 15.9 db 
Carrier/Noise Ratio - UP Link 	20.1 db 
Carrier/Total Noise Ratio 	 14.5 db 
Top Modulation Frequency 	 4 megahertz 
Modulation Index, M 	 2.5 
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Improvement Factor 	 17.7 db 
Average Signal-to-Noise Ratio 	32.3 db 
Noise Weighting Factor 	 14.5 db 
Peak-to-Peak Signal/Weighted 
Noise 	 55.2 db 
TABLE 2.4 Frequency Modulation (TV), Spacecraft to Ground 
'Tables 2.5 and 2.6 list the signal and noise levels at points 
in the system for the condition of full channel useage, or when 600 
two-way telephone circuits are in use in each frequency band. 
Transmitter Peak Power 
Capability 	 40 dbw 
Transmitter Average Power 	31.7 dbw 
Channel Test Tone Power 	 18.9 dbw 
Diplexer Loss 	 -1.0 db 
Ground Antenna Gain 	 62.1 db 
Space Attenuation 	 -200.8 db 
Receiving Antenna Gain 	 8.0 db 
Off Beam Center Allowance 	-1.5 db 
Received Test Tone Power 	 -115.3 dbw 
Receiver Noise Power Density 	-195.3 dbw/hertz 
Channel Bandwidth 	 34.9 db 
Psophometric Noise Weighting 
Factor 	 -2.5 db 
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Receiver Channel Noise (Weighted) -162.9 dbw 
Test Tone/Fluctuation Noise Ratio 47.6 db 
Test Tone/Intermodulation Noise 
Ratio 	 50.5 db 
Test Tone/Noise Ratio 	 45.8 db 
TABLE 2.5 Single Sideband Modulation (Voice) Ground to Spacecraft 
Spacecraft Transmitter Power 	6 dbw 
Diplexer and Phase Shifter 
Losses 	 -3 db 
Spacecraft Antenna Gain 	 18 db 
Space Attenuation 	 -197.1 db 
Off Beam Center Allowance 	-2 db 
Ground Antenna Gain 	 58.4 db 
Received Carrier Power 	 -119.7 dbw 
Receiver Noise Power Density 
(80°K) -209.6 dbw/hertz 
Receiver Noise Bandwidth 
(25 megahertz) 	 74.0 db 
Receiver Noise Power - Total 	-135.6 dbw 
Carrier/Total Noise Ratio 	 15.9 db 
Weighted Channel Noise Power 	-177.2 dbw 
Carrier/Channel Noise Ratio 	57.5 db 
Channel Test Tone Modulation 
Index 	 0.35 
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Test Tone/Noise Ratio 	 48.5 db 
Overall Link Test Tone/Noise 
Ratio 	 43.9 db 
Compander Improvement Factor 	15 db 
Overall Link Test Tone/Effective 
Noise Ratio 	 58.9 db 
TABLE 2.6 Phase Modulation (Voice) Spacecraft to Ground 
The spacecraft reliability requirements will now be presented for 
the Syncom II Communication satellite. The two mission functions for 
the satellite are communications and telemetry, each having its awn 
reliability characteristics. The reliability requirements for each 
of these mission functions are shown in Table 2.7, including the 
probability of survival of boost and synchronization-orientation. As 
can be seen from the table the transponder may operate in either a 
multiple access mode or frequency translation mode during the 
communication phase. 
Boost 	 50% 
Phase of Operation 	 Reliability Lifetime, Years  
Communications 
Multiple Access Mode 
Four Quadrants 	 0.96 	 1.0 
Three Quadrants 	 0.99 	 2.0 
Two Quadrants 	 0.99 	 2.5 
One Quadrant 	 0.99 	 3.0 
Frequency Translation Mode 
Four Quadrants 	 0.96 	 0.5 
Three Quadrants 	 0.99 	 1.0 
Two Quadrants 	 0.99 	 1.5 
One Quadrant 	 0.99 	 2.5 
Telemetry 
Four Quadrants 	 0.98 	 2.0 
Three Quadrants 	 0.99 	 3.0 
Two Quadrants 	 0.99 	 4.0 
One Quadrant 	 0.99 	 5.0 
TABLE 2.7 Spacecraft Reliability Requirements  
The various subsystem reliability requirements are shown in 
Table 2.8. These estimates are the reliability goals or objectives 
for each subsystem used in the satellite. 
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Subsystem and Unit 	 Reliability Objective  
Transponder Subsystem 
Transmitter 
TWT and Electronics 	 0.615 
Antenna and Diplexer 	 0.970 
Receiver 
Frequency Translation Mode 	 0.762 
Multiple-access Mode 	 0.762 
Antenna and Diplexer 	 0.958 
Antenna Control Electronics Subsystem 	 0.842 
Command Subsystem 
Receiver and Diplexer 	 0.950 
Decoder A and B 	 0.962 
Antenna and Hybrid 	 0.988 
Telemetry Subsystem 
Transmitter and Diplexer 	 0.886 
Encoder 	 0.748 
Power Supply Subsystem 
Battery and Changing Circuit 	 0.896 
Solar Panel 	 0.998 
Reaction Control Subsystem 
Solar Sensors 	 0.998 
Apogee Motor 	 0.999 
Structure 	 0.999 
TABLE 2.8 Reliability Objectives  
The reliability program plan will now be presented in same 
detail. This plan is to be implemented to assure the attainment 
of the reliability goals and objectives for a communication satellite. 
The reliability tasks to be discussed are as follows: 
. Reliability Program Organization 
. Reliability Program Plan 
. Design Review Program 
. Reliability Apportionment, Assessment, and Analysis 
. Parts Material and Process Control 
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. Supplier Reliability Control 
. Failure Reporting and Analysis and Corrective Action 
. Reliability Indoctrination and Training 
. Reliability Testing Program 
. Reliability Program Review 
Reliability Program Organization  
The main purpose of this task is to define the organization 
responsible for implementation of the communication satellite 
reliability program plan. The program organization should show 
the relationship between the reliability engineering department to 
all other departments assigned to the program. It should also 
outline all responsibilities of the reliability engineering group. 
The main points for a comprehensive organization reliability program 
call for the following action: 
. Institute and maintain an agressive program to improve 
and control reliability. 
. Assign responsibilities to each department for product 
reliability. 
. Establish reliability goals and objectives with measurable 
values assigned to elements affecting customer satisfaction. 
. Develop and formally review conceptual product designs to 
ensure they reflect and incorporate: a) customer reliability 
requirements; b) simplicity of design and standardized 
components; and, c) outcome of performance data as a result 
of feedback from the field. 
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. Verify the design and performance of the end items and 
processes. Consider installation conditions, use and service. 
Include accurate instructions on installing, operating, and 
servicing the end item. 
. Maintain a control on specifications and drawings to assure 
manufacture to current design information. 
. Establish and operate quality assurance procedures to assure 
conformance with engineering specifications. 
. Audit the reliability program by: a) conducting the 
reliability testing on each component to substantiate 
continued conformance with original verification programs; 
b) evaluating the effectiveness of the reliability programs; 
and, c) gathering, interpreting, and transmitting significant 
product performance data from the field. 
. Train each one in the reliability control technique important 
to his job. 
Reliability Program Plan 
A reliability program plan is to be formulated and defined as to 
what individual tasks will be planned to conform with the requirements 
of the applicable specifications. In order to implement the individual 
tasks, procedures will be prepared delineating all the steps necessary 
to carry out the particular task. Certain milestones and program 
schedules for each task compatible with the communication satellite 
program schedule must be defined. The program plan, to be effective, 
must be revised and updated as needed. 
The reliability program plan should provide the necessary program 
elements and procedures listed below. 
. Reliability Program Organization 
. Reliability Design Review Program 
. Reliability Apportionment, Assessment, and Analysis 
. Parts, Material, and Process Control 
. Supplier Reliability Control 
. Failure Reporting and Analysis, and Corrective Action 
. Reliability Indoctrination and Training 
. Reliability Testing Program 
. Reliability Program Review 
Reliability Design Review Program 
The best way for controlling reliability is through design and 
review. The basic philosophy includes early program use of reliable 
design techniques plus formal design reviews throughout the program. 
There are generally three phases in the sequence of a reliability 
design review: a) conceptual or preliminary review; b) detail or 
major review; and, c) improvement or verification review. A more 
detailed description of each of these phases will be made in the 
subsequent chapters covering the solution mentioned at the beginning 
of this chapter. 
The design review board should be composed of the following 
personnel, as required: 
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. The electrical design engineer 
. The physical (packaging) design engineer 
. The systems engineer 
. The product design engineer 
. The cognizant reliability engineer 
. The project engineer 
. The parts application engineer 
. The test engineer 
These board members are responsible for the review and approval 
or disapproval of the applicable design presented. 
Reliability Apportionment, Assessment, and Analysis  
The reliability program provides for the prediction and analysis 
of the communication satellite system. Inherent reliability is an 
engineering design parameter in the same sense as performance and 
weight. Procedures for the prediction of reliability are based on 
the stresses anticipated in the actual application. The method used 
for reliability prediction and analysis of the satellite is compatible 
with the military specification, MIL-STD-756A, Reliability Prediction. 
Prediction and analysis procedures apply in each phase of the 
life cycle of the system; feasibility, detail design, manufacturing, 
and service use. The feasibility prediction is used in the conceptual 
phase of the system design which covers development of the satellite 
system from its initial design concept to and including the preliminary 
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design. During the detail design phase, a prediction is made based 
on accurate parts lists, application data, environmental conditions, 
and mission profiles. The prediction made in the detail design phase 
is updated during manufacturing as new data becomes available. 
Mathematical models are used to describe the satellite reliability 
allocation, internal component reliability apportionment and relationship 
of the respective equipment to the overall system. The mathematical model 
serves as a basis for reliability reassessment, reallocation, design 
tradeoffs, logistics, and deployment. 
Reliability prediction and analysis serves as a basis to accomplish 
the following: quantify system reliability, conduct design tradeoffs, 
determine problem areas, evaluate redundancy techniques, plan test 
programs, and a guide for failure mode and effect analysis studies. 
The general sequence of steps followed in the implementation of 
the reliability prediction and analysis is shown below: 
. Define the reliability specifications and requirements. 
. Determine the environmental conditions and mission profiles. 
. Establish the reliability mathematical model(s). 
• Determine the component population for each functional element. 
. Determine appropriate stress factors for each component. 
. Conduct design analyses on component application. 
. Assign applicable failure rate to each component. 
• Compute numerical probability of success. 
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The primary sources of failure rate data are: MIL-HDBK-217A, 
Reliability Stress and Failure Rate Data for Electronic Equipment, 
IDEP (Interservice Data Exchange Program), customer supplied information, 
manufacturers' data, and information published in engineering journals. 
An initial assumption is made that the time to failure distri-
bution is exponential. As sufficient operating time and failure 
information becomes available, analyses are performed to determine 
the actual failure distribution. Use is made of the three parameter 
Weibull distribution which considers constant, increasing and decreasing 
failure rates. 
Parts Material and Process Control 
The main purpose of this task will deal with the reliability of 
parts, material, and processes in the communication satellite system. 
Part failure modes, mechanisms, and causes will be discussed as well 
as those materials and processing factors needed to assure reliability 
of the system. 
The reliability function will be responsible for the following: 
. Review part requirements and specifications. 
. Collect parts application information for use in system 
tradeoffs to maximize reliability. 
. Measure reliability of each part so the reliability of the 
system can be predicted. 
. To maintain surveillance over all parts during the production 
and manufacturing phase to assure their continuing reliability. 
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Specifications for all parts will have to be prepared and should 
include as a minimum the following: 
. Required part parameters 
. Service conditions 
. Type and vendor approval requirements 
. Requirements for packaging and marking of each component 
. Requirements for lot qualification 
. Screening and acceptance requirements 
. Approved sources of procurement 
. Qualification requirements. 
In some cases special fabrication processes will occur which have 
not been dealt with previously by others or by manufacturers. It should 
be the responsibility of reliability engineering to ensure that such 
processes are recognized early in the design, are thoroughly inves-
tigated and evaluated, and are covered by a process specification and 
a manufacturing procedure. A more detailed discussion will be presented 
in the "solution" portion of this paper. 
Supplier Reliability Control  
Supplier reliability control provides assurance of delivery of 
components, parts and materials that meet the reliability requirements 
for the communication satellite. Supplier reliability controls are 
implemented in order to effectively monitor a supplier's conformance 
to stipulated reliability requirements. Requirements for supplier 
control are specified in the reliability work statement. 
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Each supplier is provided with guidelines upon which to base the 
reliability program. These guidelines are formal documents and include 
information on the following: supplier organization for reliability, 
reliability program planning, design review, prediction and analysis, 
test program, failure reporting system, indoctrination and training, 
mathematical methods, lower tier supplier controls, and documentation. 
Reliability personnel represent the reliability function and 
provide services and support to the following activities: 
. Make or buy team 
. Survey team 
. Source evaluation team 
. Weighting team 
. Source selection board 
Liaison is maintained with the cognizant reliability representatives 
of the supplier's facility. Personnel are assigned when required as 
resident representatives to monitor the supplier's performance. 
Periodic supplier facility surveys are made to assure that the 
supplier possesses the requisite capabilities to provide the necessary 
materials, equipment or services that meet the reliability requirements. 
Reliability personnel are members of the facility survey along with 
quality control, engineering production, and procurement. 
Reliability personnel review the records of supplier performance 
for indications of performance trends that could affect the reliability 
of the communication system. Early failure mode analyses are made and 
investigation performed to determine causes of failures. Corrective 
measures are instituted, and the effectiveness of these measures 
monitored by reliability personnel. 
Failure Reporting and Analysis and Corrective Action  
A failure reporting system will be established to provide for the 
detection of failure modes, causes of failure, and the feedback of 
information for corrective action during the satellite program. A 
failure is normally defined as operation outside the tolerance limits 
given in the performance specification. 
The following elements form the basis of the failure reporting 
system: 
. Detection of system failure 
. Recording of all pertinent data 
. Information on data processing record cards 
. Store information for reference 
. Retrieve information as required 
. Analyze data for determination of basic failure modes and 
causes of failure 
. Summarize the generated information 
. Recommend corrective action to prevent recurrence of failure 
. Report the final results to cognizant personnel. 
The purpose of the failed parts analysis is to determine the 
basic cause of failure and evaluate the need for changes in design, 
material, workmanship, manufacturing, inspection, testing and handling. 
Recommendations for corrective actions designed to prevent recurrence 
of the experienced failure are a part of failure analysis. 
Failed parts will be subjected to the following procedure as required: 
. Review all test data and system performance requirements. 
. Review description of failure and failure symptoms. 
. Examine physical unit and associated equipment. 
. Review all previous failure data on similar systems. 
. Conduct verification and diagnostic testing. 
. Submit samples to special tests, such as radiographic, and 
infra-red examination as required. 
. Perform dissection analysis. 
. Prepare drawings, illustrations, and photographs. 
. Determine mode of failure and recommend corrective action. 
Reliability Indoctrination and Training 
Reliability indoctrination and training courses will be conducted 
for all personnel assigned to the program. The object of the training 
is the motivation of personnel in the utilization of reliability concepts 
and the importance of each personas contribution to the reliability of 
the final system. 
Recognizing the high reliability performance required, these 
courses will thoroughly familiarize each individual on the program 
with his duties. A continuous program will provide an attitude of 
reliability consciousness in all personnel. The reliability engineer-
ing staff will coordinate with the training supervisor on reliability 
training of all program personnel. Coincident with this training will 
be instructions to operating personnel regarding their particular work 
functions. 
There are a few levels for which the reliability courses will be 
prepared. One level is management, engineering, and supervision, where 
detail definitions, concepts and the philosophy of reliability will be 
presented. Another level is the operating personnel, including 
manufacturing, assembly, inspection and test groups. 
Indoctrination courses for the assembly and test personnel will 
be conducted to acquaint them with reliability concepts and goals. 
After an initial general lecture on reliability concepts, specific 
training will be keyed to the particular job function. This specific 
training will consist of delineating the reliability requirements for 
the communication satellite system and presenting them in a clear and 
enlightening manner to the operating personnel. All personnel assigned 
to the satellite program will be made to recognize the concept that 
building a high reliable communication system is an exercise in 
perfection. Visual aids will be prepared for parameters difficult 
to describe in familiar or technical terms. 
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Human factors will be a consideration in reliability training, 
and will be integrated into each training course. In order to insure 
the integration of human factors into the overall training program, it 
is necessary not only that they be valid, but that they be timely. This 
study will take into account the learning ability, sensory ability and 
experience of each group. The necessity for maintaining a consistently 
high level of workmanship will be impressed upon all personnel. Require-
ments of the work functions will be specifically delineated, with special 
attention to the interaction between operating personnel and the designed 
system. 
Motivation incentives will be oriented to provide the proper mental 
"set" for the exacting requirements of each job function. As a necessary 
adjunct, reward and motivation activities will be established. Voluntary 
honesty in reporting all discrepancies will be encouraged. The prevailing 
work attitude and conditions will provide an atmosphere in which inherent 
reliability of design is not degraded during production. 
Reliability Testing Program 
This is one of the most important tasks to be performed an a high 
reliability program such as this one proposed here. The main objective 
will be to describe the special testing required on parts and assemblies 
to assure reliability achievement. 
The reliability engineering department will be responsible for 
planning and implementation of special parts and assembly tests as 
required per specifications. The tests to be performed and their 
milestones will have to be delineated in the test plans. There test 
plans will detail the test procedures and should be approved by design 
engineering and all other personnel involved directly. 
Any additional testing that may be required to assure compliance 
with the program requirements should be implemented by reliability 
engineering. For a communications satellite program special testing 
might be made on the following components and/or units: 
. Tunnel Diodes 
. Tunnel Diode Amplifiers (TDA) 
. Tunnel Diode Amplifier Circulators 
. Traveling Wave Tube Amplifiers (TWTA) 
Reliability Program Review 
This task is to review the effectiveness of the reliability program. 
Special required reports will be prepared and reviewed with responsible 
personnel. These reports could include the following, as required: 
. Reliability Program Plan 
. Minutes of Design Reviews 
. Reliability Assessments and Analysis 
. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
. Parts Specifications 
. Failure Reports and Analysis with Corrective Actions 
. Monthly Status Reports 
Regular meetings will also be held with the program manager to discuss 
outstanding problems as related to the reliability tasks for the program. 
CHATTER 3  
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM 
The next two chapters will be devoted to the solution of 
the problem: the implementation of a reliability program for a 
communication satellite possessing a high degree of reliability. 
This chapter will cover the following reliability program tasks in 
detail: 
. Reliability Program Organization 
. Reliability Program Plan 
. Reliability Design Review 
. Reliability Apportionment, Assessment, and Analysis. 
Chapter 4 will be devoted entirely to the remaining reliability 
program tasks, 
. Parts, Material and Process Control 
. Supplier Reliability Control 
. Failure Reporting and Analysis, and Corrective Action 
. Reliability Indoctrination and Training 
. Reliability Testing Program 
. Reliability Program Review. 
Reliability Program Organization 
In organizing for high product reliability the program must be 
placed under the direction of a manager who is technically competent 
and thoroughly familiar with all avenues of reliability. The 
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reliability organization must report to top management thus making 
top management aware and conscious of reliability as well as of 
manufacturing, purchasing, engineering, and marketing. In addition 
to being technically competent, the reliability manager must have 
knowledge of his company's product. He should also have managerial 
skills and talents for organizing and planning for reliability tasks. 
Experience in manufacturing and marketing and some knowledge of 
statistics will also help. It should be noted and emphasized that 
responsibility for reliability remains with the line organization. 
The task of the reliability program manager is in planning, monitoring, 
and coordinating the reliability effort. 
There is no specific organization chart or structure that will 
fit all divisions or meet all product lines. It is very desirable 
to coordinate the reliability effort with the line functions. A 
suggested organization chart is shown in Figure 3.1. 
Let us look a little closer at the reliability structure. Shown 
in Figure 3.2 is a functional organization chart of a typical reliability 
engineering department. The Parts Reliability section is responsible 
for the following tasks: 
. Writing of parts procurement specifications. 
. Writing of specifications for parts testing. 
. Surveillance of parts testing. 
. Writing of test reports for parts testing program. 
. Document and publish standard parts lists. 
FIGURE 3.1 Reliability Organization Chart 14.7 
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FIGURE 3.2 Reliability Engineering Functional Organization Chart  
. Assist in parts selection and application. 
. Investigate failed parts and follow up action. 
. Review parts documents for use and requirements. 
. Survey suppliers' facilities before procurement of parts. 
• Participate in data exchange programs of parts. 
. Monitor parts handling, transportation and storage techniques. 
. Assist engineering design and drafting sections in selection of 
reliable parts. 
The next section, Systems Reliability, details the responsibilities 
for the following: 
. Review of systems designs. 
. Establish reliability audit points. 
. Assessment of systems reliability (predictions). 
. Systems reliability requirements established. 
. Writing of systems reliability test specifications. 
• Surveillance of systems reliability tests. 
. Writing of systems reliability test reports. 
. Survey sub-contractor facilities. 
. Systems failures and malfunctions investigated and 
corrective action written. 
. Aid in statistical analysis as required. 
The last section in the functional organization chart is 
Reliability Analysis. This section is responsible for performing 
the following tasks: 
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. Establish and monitor failure reporting and corrective action. 
. Establish and monitor operate time accumulation system. 
. Train and indoctrinate personnel by preparing and conducting 
reliability training and indoctrination programs. 
. Prepare procedures for statistical and mathematical methodology. 
In a program such as a communications satellite, reliability should 
be organized to provide the tasks delineated above in a most efficient 
manner. The reliability department should be so organized that their 
decisions should not be compromised by other departments which are 
primarily interested in the cost of producing the unit and its delivery 
schedule. Too often this is the case where it seems, for a while anyway, 
that money and on time delivery will solve all of the program's problems. 
But because of a component or unit that was purchased without adequate 
screening and testing, the reliability of the complete system will be 
in jeopardy. In this type of program, where reliability is of the 
utmost importance, this cannot and should not be allowed to take place. 
A proper reliability organization as described above should be set up 
to prevent this type of operation from happening. The organization 
should be able to establish policies as well as have the means to 
carry their policies out. The reliability organization, to be effective, 
should not be static but must adjust and correct in response to operating 
experience and advances in the technology of the state-of-the-art. The 
organization described in this section will obtain maximum return from 
the money invested in the communications satellite reliability program 
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where the program is programmed and managed maturely. The time 
phasing of the reliability program with each of its stages with the 
corresponding stages of development, production, and field use will 
help accomplish this. 
Reliability Program Plan  
The main purpose of a reliability program plan is to define 
management decisions on all of the reliability tasks in a way that 
represents the best judgement of the customer and the contractor. 
The program plan should define what activities will constitute a 
reliability program and how each activity will be carried out to a 
successful completion. The plan should also define which items or 
pieces of equipment will be subjected to which disciplines, how much 
effort will be expended on the application of each task discipline to 
each piece of equipment, and when these reliability tasks will be 
performed. The plan also describes the related reliability activities 
of other departments or organizations in order that effective and sound 
coverage is maintained throughout the program. 
The reliability program plan describes all reliability procedures 
and methods needed to carry out the required reliability tasks. It 
should be written in such a manner as to permit the customer or its 
representatives to determine the adequacy of the reliability program 
for the system. 
The reliability plan for the communications satellite should 
delineate all areas of reliability work that is required during 
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development and production of the complete system. It must include, 
as described in the previous section, reliability technical and 
administrative concepts, all operational details of the program, and 
necessary documentation needed to carry out the required tasks in 
the operational phase. 
The reliability program plan should be reviewed for updating 
as required to reflect the latest program requirements. The 
reliability department is responsible for coordinating and dis-
seminating these changes, whether they be additions or deletions. 
A satellite reliability program of the type discussed here is 
best viewed in terms of the types of malfunctions or failures that 
must be predicted, detected, prevented, and corrected during the 
design and development phase of the program. 
The following failure contributors must be recognized, all of 
which will determine the reliability levels achieved by the 
communications satellite: 
. Random failures (a random failure is any catastrophic 
failure whose probability of happening is stationary with 
respect to time, and whose occurrence within any given 
interval of time is, consequently, unpredictable, or alter-
natively, failures which are individually unpredictable). 
Degradation failures (this is a failure that results from a 
gradual change in performance characteristics of an equipment 
or part with time). 
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. Part and unit environmental failures. 
. Packaging inadequacy failures. 
. Poor workmanship failures. 
. Fabrication process failures. 
. Checkout procedure failures. 
. Storing and shipping failures. 
The main difference in a reliability program for a non-maintain-
able satellite such as this is that almost all tasks are basically 
irreversible. It is like a trapeze artist who completes 999 good 
swings on the bar (out of a possible 1000) and makes one bad swing. 
As far as the audience is concerned the trapeze artist tried his best 
and was 99.9 percent perfect. But looking at it from a more practical 
view, the artist had zero reliability (remembering that reliability is 
defined as the probability of mission success without any failures). 
Some of the key objectives to consider in planning a reliability 
program plan are as follows: 
. The customer should present the manufacturer with an operational 
analysis of the system, such as delineating all modes of 
operation used in the communications satellite (as detailed 
in TABLE 2.7 Spacecraft Reliability Requirements in Chapter 2.) 
Also, the numerical reliability requirements, such as probability 
of completing the given mission, failure rates for the various 
components, and application factors should be made available. 
. Make sure that the basic definition of component failures 
and system failures is clearly understood by all concerned. 
This is very important when the Reliability Testing phase of 
the program is initiated. 
. The methods and reasons used to derive the reliability assess-
ments and predictions should be clearly explained. Any 
assumptions made while preparing the estimate, such as use 
of redundancy in certain portions of the electronics, should 
be stated and justified to customer satisfaction. 
• An explicit definition of the accuracy of instrumentation that 
will be used during certain portions of the program. 
. Any data reduction techniques that are initiated and considered 
necessary should be delineated to the fullest. 
It is believed that the reliability program plan as described in 
Chapter 2 will be sufficient in attaining the required reliability 
requirements for a communications satellite. This requirement can be 
stated as successful operation of an extremely complex system in a 
space environment for periods of up to 5 years. 
The elements of the reliability program plan will now be discussed 
in some detail, starting with the Reliability Design Review tasks, then 
Reliability Apportionment, Assessment, and Analysis, followed by Parts 
Material and Process Control. The remaining tasks will be discussed 
in the following chapter. 
5)4. 
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Reliability Design Review 
A formal definition of a design review can be stated as follows: 
A reliability design review is an evaluation of a system and/or the 
components making up the system for the purpose of recommending design 
changes which will ultimately improve its reliability. The design 
review gives consideration to other design criteria such as producibility, 
schedules, weight, size, cost, performance, and maintainability in order 
to achieve the optimum reliability compatible with the other criteria. 
The main objectives of a reliability design review are, a) to review the  
progress of the design; b) to monitor reliability growth and achievements; 
c) to assure the reliability requirements will be met in an optimum 
manner; and, d) to provide feedback information to all concerned groups 
involved in the program. 
The system should be reviewed by personnel not directly associated 
with its design and development. A well organized reliability department 
will have reliability engineers who are qualified in performing this 
task. A very important point should be made here. A reliability design 
review is not considered as a duplication of effort of the design 
engineering group. A design review committee or board will evaluate 
the performance objectives with the methods and techniques of 
reliability design review, performed as an independent effort of the 
design engineer, in order to assure a more effective system design. 
Figure 3.3 shows the general areas for which design reviews 
are scheduled. 
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FIGURE 30 Scope of Design Reviews vs. Phase of Development  
Effective design reviews are held when all aspects of the design 
are examined in detail. The areas examined should include but are not 







. Human Factors 
. Safety 
. Ease of Installation 
. Simplicity 
. Requirements. 
The design reviews should also cover system concept, design 
philosophy when using tradeoffs, application of parts, materials, 
circuits, processes, structures, configuration, and thermal design. 
The design review committee should be composed of the following 
personnel, as required: 
. Design engineer. 
. Packaging design engineer. 
. Systems engineer. 
. Product design engineer. 
. Reliability engineer. 
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. Project engineer. 
. Parts application engineer. 
. Test engineer. 
. Quality Assurance engineer. 
. Manufacturing. 
Each design review member should be experienced in his particular 
area to assume all responsibilities for his decisions. Each member 
should have the ability to criticize another member's work area by 
suggesting changes or alternates for product improvement. 
To be effective, design reviews should be conducted at several 
different stages during the program. These stages can be divided into 
the following: 
. Conceptual Design. 
. Developmental Design. 
. Final Design. 
The first review or conceptual design review should be held at 
the time the new design is in the planning stage and before the detailed 
design efforts began to consider the design philosophy and approaches 
required to meet the required specification and to assure that the 
specifications contain realistic requirements. 
The next review or developmental design review is made to verify 
the adequacy of final designs based on the approved conceptual design 
and any changes made up to this time, to establish the requirements for 
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future purchasing, to establish initial reliability efforts such as 
assessments and predictions, and to identify problem areas. This review 
will be held early in the development phase of the program. 
Before the final review, an interface review should be held. This 
review is held at a subsystem level in which the operational character-
istics for each subsystem are checked for proper interfaces between each 
subsystem within the system. 
The last review, the final design review, is a release of the 
review for preproduction. This review will verify the function and a 
configuration with the requirements of the system, provide final parts, 
materials, and process approvals, provide a final reliability review, 
and equipment specifications and reliability test procedure review. All 
detailed drawings will be released at this time to provide manufacturing 
with suitable information to build the system. 
Some of the key tasks that should be performed during the design 
review stages can be stated as: a) circuit analysis, b) reliability stress 
analysis, and c) failure mode and effect analysis. 
Circuit analysis. The operating life of the circuit is decreased 
due to drifting of part values in many cases, thus causing unacceptable 
degradation in the performance of the circuit. There are several 
techniques that should be used to determine the acceptable usable 
tolerances. The computer technique is one of these. The following 
procedure is generally used: Equivalent circuits are drawn of the 
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system, unit, or module; circuit equations are written in terms of parts 
parameters (includes rating of parts, end-of-life tolerances, and circuit 
failure criteria); a computer program is written based on the circuit 
equations, requirements, and expected part parameter drift; the computer 
program is run and the output reviewed and analyzed. The computer aided 
design program is being used at an increasing rate throughout the industry 
and has proven very useful as well as time saving. Another method used 
is the analog tester method. Drift effects are checked by sequentially 
switching in every combination of high and low end point tolerance-limit 
values and evaluating the effects on the circuit performance. This 
method has the advantage of not needing a complete mathematical equation 
of the circuit to perform the analysis of tolerance limits. 
Reliability stress analysis. Reliability stress analysis is 
performed to assure the proper application of component parts and to 
determine the actual stresses to which each component part is subjected. 
Stress analysis is therefore an essential element in the Reliability 
Program for newly designed electronic equipment. 
The reliability of component parts is directly related to the stress 
that is imposed in the application. In most instances this relationship 
is inversely proportional, the higher the stress the lower the reliability. 
This shows that the design safety factor (ratio of maximum allowable 
stress to actual part stress) is a prime consideration. The safety 
factor must be determined by tradeoffs between volume, cost and 
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reliability. In order to predict the reliability of newly designed 
equipment it is essential that applied stresses be known. In most 
design and development activities, breadboard models are built to verify 
electrical performance characteristics. To demonstrate a reliability 
performance value requires prohibitively long periods of time. It 
therefore becomes necessary that reliability efforts are utilized in 
the design phase to provide assurances that the reliability design goals 
are being met. 
Applied part stresses are computed by means of a circuit analysis. 
Such an analysis is performed by examination on a functional circuit. The 
circuit is separated into several sub-functions to allow for ease of 
mathematical calculations. Care is exercised in the sub-divisions to 
account for all interacting impedances and/or generators. The sub-functional 
circuit is then analyzed to determine all voltages and/or currents that 
the individual parts are subjected to. This is accomplished by drawing 
an equivalent circuit of the actual circuit in terms of equivalent 
generators and impedances. The analysis is then put on a form which 
contains a description of each part, its maximum rated stress, applied 
temperature and electrical stresses, failure rate and failure effect upon 
the circuit. Three component part failure modes are assumed, open, short, 
and degraded. Each failure mode is classified as to the severity of its 
effect upon the circuit performance. The purpose of the failure effects 
analysis is to ascertain the degree of degradation resulting from the 
occurrence of one or more of the failure modes determined in the failure 
mode assumption. 
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Failure mode and effect analysis. A failure mode and effect analysis 
will identify the principal functions of the part, component or subsystem 
and the possible modes of failure. The areas in which failures are most 
likely to occur will be identified and their effect upon the functions of 
the system will be presented. The proposed measures to eliminate the 
effects of such failures will be delineated. Comprehensive study to ascer-
tain the component's ability to withstand functional stresses or combinations 
of environmental stresses will be conducted. Reliability hazards resulting 
from such anticipated stresses such as thermal, electrical and vibration 
will be specifically assessed in terms of component integrity. 
The failure mode and effect analysis will contain the following: 
. Part name and number. 
. Specific individual functions. 
. Failure mode description - from analytical considerations and 
from test experiences. 
. Probability of occurrence - high, low and insignificant. 
. Failure effect - actual and potential on component function. 
. Action to be taken to remedy or prevent the failure occurrence 
or effect. 
. Revisions as required by significant changes and corrective action 
affecting design. 
A detailed check list is a most useful tool to be used in design 
reviews. It should be prepared jointly by design and reliability per-
sonnel. A typical check list is given in Table 3.1 showing typical areas 
of investigation that are looked into during a design review. 
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TABLE 3.1 Reliability Design Review Check List  
1. Are the requirements for performance, signals, environment, life, 
and reliability established for each component? 
2. Are the specific design criteria for reliability and safety of each 
component specified? 
3. Are maintenance requirements and maintainability goals established? 
4. Have acceptance, qualification, sampling, and reliability assurance 
tests been established? 
5. Are standardized high-reliability parts being used? 
6. Are unreliable parts identified? 
7. Has the required failure rate for each part or part class been 
established? 
8. Are component parts selected to meet reliability requirements? 
9. Have "below-state-of-the-art" parts or problems been identified? 
10. Has shelf life of parts chosen for final design been determined? 
11. Have limited-life parts been identified, and inspection and 
replacement requirements specified? 
12. Have critical parts which require special procurement, testing, 
and handling been identified? 
13. Are derating factors being used in the application of parts? 
(Indicate level.) 
14. Are safety factors being used in the application of parts? 
15. Are circuit safety margins ample? 
16. Are standard and proven circuits utilized wherever possible? 
17. Has the need for the selection of parts (matching) been eliminated? 
18. Have circuit studies been made considering variability and degradation 
of electrical parameters of parts? 
19. Have adjustments been minimized? 
TABLE 3.1 (Continued)  
20. Have all vital adjustments been classified as to factory, 
preoperational, or operator types? 
21. Have stability requirements of all circuits or components 
associated with each adjustment been established? 
22. Have specification limits for each adjustment - such as "no 
adjustment," "readjustment to nominal," or "classify as failure" -
been established? 
23. Is feedback being used wherever required to maintain constant 
gain of circuits? 
24. Are regulated power supplies used for critical circuits? 
25. Are similar plugs and connectors adequately protected against 
insertion in wrong sockets? 
26. Are solid-state devices being used where practicable? 
27. Are malfunction-indicating circuits or devices being used 
extensively? 
28. Are self-monitoring or self-calibration devices installed in major 
systems where possible? 
29. Are mechanical support structures adequate? 
30. Are heat transfer devices or designs efficient? 
31. Is there a concentrated effort to make the developmental model as 
near to the production model as possible? 
32. Has equipment been designed for the elimination of shock mounts 
and vibration isolators where possible? 
33. Are elapsed time indicators installed in major components? 
34. Are fungus-inert materials and fungus-proofing techniques being 
used? 




TABLE 3.1 (Continued)  
36. Has the theoretical reliability or MTBF of the component based 
on the actual application of the parts been determined? 
(a) Comparison made with reliability goal. 
(b) Provision for necessary design adjustments. 
37. Are the best available methods for reducing the adverse effects 
of operational environments on critical parts being utilized? 
38. Has provision been made for the use of electronic failure 
prediction techniques, including marginal testing? 
39. Does the basic design provide for the system to meet serviceability 
goals established for field test operations? 
40. Is there provision for improvements to eliminate any design 
inadequacies observed in engineering tests? 
41. Have normal modes of failure and the magnitude of each mode for 
each component or critical part been identified? 
42. In the application of failure rates of components to reliability 
equations, have the following effects been considered? 
(a) External effects on the system or branch in which the 
component is located. 
(b) Internal effects on the component. 
(c) Common effects, or direct effect of one component on 
another component, because of mechanical or electromechanical 
linkage. 
43. Has redundancy been provided where needed to meet reliability 
goals? 
In conclusion, the design review is a very important task of 
the complete reliability program and is one of the essentials in the 
communication satellite design effort. It is the responsibility of 
the reliability engineering department to work with and supply those 
tools necessary to bring objective evidence of their results into the 
design review. As a result, optimum decisions will be provided in 
designing, at lowest cost, the most reliable communication satellite 
system possible. 
Reliability Apportionment, Assessment, and Analysis  
The major factors in the design and development phase of the 
communication satellite are the reliability apportionment, assess-
ment, and analysis. These are very useful analytical tools to 
provide a realistic basis upon which tradeoff studies can be 
evaluated. 
In Table 2.8, the reliability objectives were presented for 
the Syncom II communication satellite. In a way one could say that 
this is the reliability apportionment or reliability budget for the 
system. In the apportionment numerical reliability objectives or 
goals have been apportioned to the various modules and subsystems 
throughout the satellite. This reliability model will be continually 
up-dated as changes are made resulting from design reviews or changes 
in scope on the overall program. This model will be used in the 
reliability assessments or estimates for each element of the system. 
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Typical failure rates in percent per 1000 hours are shown in 
Table 3,2. These failure rates give approximate estimates of potential 
reliability only. For high population parts these failure rates were 
obtained from Mil-Handbook-217, Reliability Stress and Failure Rate 
Data for Electronic Equipment. The test conditions were assumed to 
be at an environmental temperature of 55°C and a stress derating of 
90 percent (stress level of 10 percent of rating). The failure rates 
for low population parts that were not available from Mil-Handbook-217 
were taken from secondary sources in the industry. 
The reliability of nonredundant systems is found by assuming all 
elements in a series and summing the individual parts failure rates. 
We are assuming here the exponential case of chance or random failures 
and there the expected number of failures is the same for equally 
long operating periods. In this case the reliability is mathematically 
defined by the exponential formula 
In this formula a is the base of the natural logarithm 
(2.71828 - - -),  λ (lamda) is a constant defined as the chance 
failure rate, and t is an arbitrary operating time for which the 
reliability R of the system is wanted. Both the failure rate and 
the operating time have to be expressed in the same time units - 
usually in hours. 
It should also be pointed out this formula is correct for 
systems or devices which have been debugged which are not subject 
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COMPONENT 	 DERATING TO 0.10 
Antenna 	 0.0200 
Capacitors 
Ceramic 	 0.0010 
Ceramic, variable 	 0.0010 
Electrolytic 	 0.1400 
Glass 	 0.0030 
Mica 0.0010 
Mica, button 	 0.0010 
Mica, dipped 0.0010 
Paper 	 0.0010 
Tantalum 0.0100 
Tantalum, foil 	 0.0150 
Tantalum, slug 0.0010 
Crystals 	 0.0200 
Coaxial connectors 	 0.0200 
Coaxial relay 	 0.0250 
Coupler, direction 	 0.0100 
Diodes 	 0.0100 
Switching 	 0.0020 
Varacter 0.0210 
Zener 	 0.0150 
Filters 0.0160 
Ferrite phase shifter 	 0.0200 
Junction box 	 0.0010 
Inductors 0.0020 
Mixers 	 0.0300 
Resistors 
Composition 	 0.0020 
Film 	 0.0290 
Film, power 	0.1080 
Wire wound 	 0.0170 
Wire wound, power 	 0.0006 
RFC 	 0.0010 
Transformers 	 0.0500 
Transistors 0.0200 
Traveling wave tube 	 5.0 
TABLE 3.2 Typical Failure Rates - Failures/105  Hours  
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to early failures, and which have not yet suffered any wearout 
damage or performance degradation because of age. This is shown 
in Figure 3.4, Component Failure Rate as a Function of Age, and is 
known as the "bathtub curve." 
The reciprocal of the failure rate is called the mean time 
between failures, or MTBF. It is usually written as a lower case 
letter m. Then by definition, in the exponential case, the mean time 
between failures, or MTBF is 
1 
m = ---- 
λ 
and the reliability function R(t) can be also written in the form 
R(t) = e-t/m 
The derivation of the exponential formula for reliability is 
presented here because of its importance in the reliability discipline. 
Assume a fixed number of components are repeatedly tested. Let N
0 
 = the 
total number of components tested, N
s 
= the total number of components 
surviving, Nf = the total number of components failed. Therefore 
N = N
s Nf 
is a constant during the whole test because as the test 
is being performed, the number of failed components increases exactly 
as the number of surviving components decreases. Reliability is defined 





are counted at a specific time t. 
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FIGURE 3.4 Component Failure Rate as a Function of Age 
Unreliability, or probability of failure is defined as 
As can be seen at once R + Q = 1. These events are called 
complementary events because each of the components will either 
survive or fail. In probability terms they are also referred to as 
mutually exclusive events because if one component survives, it has 
not failed, and vice versa. 




 - Nf  
and reliability can also be expressed as 
By differention of this equation we obtain 
because N
O 
is constant. Rearranging the differential yields 
which is the rate at which components fail. Also 
which is the negative rate at which components survive. 
At any time t there are still Ns components in test; 




Dividing both sides of equation (3.5) by Ns yields on the left the 
rate of failure or the instantaneous probability of failure per one 
component,  which is called the failure rate X: 
But from equation (3.1) the following is obtained: 
1/R = N O/N S. Substituting this on the right side of equation (3.6) yields  
which is the general expression for the failure rate that applies 
to any type of reliability function, either exponential or non-
exponential. By rearrangement and integration of (3.7) the general 
equation for reliability is obtained 
Solving for R assuming that at time t=o, R=1 
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Now if λ is constant in equation (3.8), the exponent becomes 
r λdt 	-λt 
and the well known exponential reliability equation for constant 
failure rate results, 
R(t) = e
-At 
This elaborate derivation of the exponential reliability 
formula was presented because the derivation can help to measure the 
failure rate of a component population. For a complete detailed 
discussion on this subject see reference, Igor Bazovsky, "Reliability 
Theory and Practice." 
The satellite reliability model should be based on the following 
phases of the mission: 
. Boost and Launch Phase 
. Acquisition Phase 
. Orbital Phase. 
The boost and launch phase includes that phase in which the 
spacecraft equipment satisfactorily completes the liftoff and final 
booster turnoff. All necessary operations from booster turnoff until 
final satellite orbit positioning is the acquisition phase. The 
orbital phase includes all operations after successful satellite 
deployment. This phase is based on the mission time, usually 5 years 
or 43,800 hours. 
When performing a reliability prediction) a degradation factor 
has to be used in conjunction with each part failure rate to take 
account of the actual environment seen by the satellite. Typical 
degradation factors for various environments have been measured 
over long periods of time and are shown here. 
	
1.0 	Laboratory 
0.9 	Military Ground Station 
0.13 	Shipborne 
0.07 	Trailer-mounted 
0.04 	Manned Aircraft 
The value of 0.33 is the degradation factor for satellite 
environment in that part of space outside of the lower Van Allen 
radiation belt. 
It should be a general rule that no component part in the 
communication satellite be operated at a higher level than 25 percent 
of rated use. This practice is essential for long-lived operation 
such as a five year life for the satellite. It is a known fact that 
the failure rates of components are a function of some power of the 
ratio of applied stress to rated stress. There are some general rules 
to follow for determining failure rates for various components. Let 
us review some here. 
For semiconductors an application analysis should be performed 
to determine that none of the maximum ratings will be exceeded. A 
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classification according to type of material (germanium or silicon) 
used should be made. Next determine the ambient temperature and power 
dissipation at operating conditions. Finally determine the component 
failure rates from families of curves as shown in Figures 3.5 and 3.6. 
For resistors the procedure is similar. Classify component 
according to specific type. Determine the ambient temperature and 
power dissipation and wattage rating, including derating and voltage 
limitation. Find part failure rate based on temperature and percent 
of rating. Typical curves are shown in Figures 3.7 and 3.8. 
The next components are capacitors. It is known that the 
expected life of capacitors varies as the fifth power of the ratio 
of rated to applied voltage. After the capacitor has been classified 
determine the peak voltage, including AC, ripple and pulse voltage. 
Determine the ambient temperature, then find the failure rate from 
curves as shown in Figures 3.9 through 3.12. Adjust the failure rate 
found by multiplying it by one for DC applied voltage, by two for sine 
wave AC voltage, or by three for narrow pulses. 
The failure rates for transformers and coils are calculated based 
on the type of insulation used and the hot-spot temperature of the 
device. The hot-spot temperature is defined as the ambient temperature 
plus the temperature rise inside the device. The failure rates are 
given in Figure 3.13. Also used is a multiplying factor depending on 
the application as follows: 
Figure 3.5 Failure Rates for Silicon Transistors 
NOTE: 
For Power Diodes (>1 watt) multiply by 2.0 
For Computer Application Divide by 2.5 
For Zener (Reference) Diodes Multiply by 7 
FIGURE 3.6 Failure Rates for Silicon Diodes 
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FIGURE 3.7 Failure Rates for Composition Resistors 
FIGURE 3.8 Failure Rates for Film Resistors 
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FIGURE 3.9 Failure Rates for Paper Capacitors 
FIGURE 3.10 Failure Rates for Mica Capacitors 
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8o 
FIGURE 3.11 Failure Rates for Ceramic or Glass Capacitors 
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FIGURE 3.12 Failure Rates for Tantalum Capacitors 
FIGURE 3.13 Failure Rates for Transformers and Coils 
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FAILURE RATE 
MULTIPLYING FACTOR 	 APPLICATION 
	
1.0 	 Plate and power transformers, filter 
chokes, motor windings, filament and 
audio transformers. 
0.3 	 Tuning inductances (low voltage 
devices). 
1.5 	 Pulse transformers, IF transformers, 
tuning inductances (high voltage 
devices). 
Rotary components' failure rates are obtained by using Figure 3.14. 
The stresses are similar to the transformers and coils. Rotary devices 
include motors, blowers, generators, dynamotors, synchros, and resolvers. 
There are two major areas of failure: mechanical and electrical. Mech-
anical failures are usually associated with bearings and brushes and 
are due to frictional effects. The windings are basically insulated 
wire wrapped around a magnetic core therefore analogous to a transformer 
and can be rated in the same way as far as electrical failures are 
concerned. 
In determining the failure rate for relays the steps listed below 
should be followed. 
. From Table 3.3 find the base failure rate based on relay 
classification, contact rating and coil power. 
. Determine the life expectancy (operations causing 10 percent 
failures) of contact mechanisms. 
. From Table 3.4 find the failure rate per contact set based 
on total actuations. 
FIGURE 3.14 Failure Rates for Rotary Devices 
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. From circuit data calculate contact load in percent of rated 
current. From Table 3.5 select the proper load factor and 
multiply by failure rate found above. 
• To obtain the final relay failure rate add contact sup-
plementary failure rates to the base failure rates. 
TABLE 3.3 Relay Base Failure Rate  
Relay Class Contact Rating Coil Power 
Base Failure 
Rate 
Sensitive 100 pa to 1.5 amp Less than 0.1 watt 400 
General purpose 100 pa to 10 amp Above 0.1 watt 250 
Power Above 10 amp * 40 
Thermal 100 µa to 10 amp - 400 
*In this class of relay, restrictions of coil power are not normal. 
TABLE 3.4 Relay Failure Rates per Contact Set  
Total Actuations 	 
for 90 Percent 
Survival 
Probability 
100,000 18 35 53 70  88 105 123 140 158 175 
90,00o 20 39 59 78 98 117 137 156 175 195 
80,000 22 44 66 88 109 131 153 175 197 219 
70,000 25 50 75 100 125 15o 175 200 225 250 
60,000 29 58 88 117 
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175 2o4 233 263 292 
50, 000 35 70 105 140 175 210 245 280 315 350 
4o,000 44 88 131 175 219 262 306 350 394 437 
30,000 58 117 175 233 292 350 408 466 515 583 
20,000 88 175 262 35o 437 525 612 700 787 875 
10,00o 175 350 525 700 875 1050 1225 1400 1575 1750 
NOTES: 1. For manual switches, the chart applies directly. 
2. For relays, apply chart and add the following 
supplementary failure rates: 
Sensitive and thermal delay relays 	400 
General purpose relays 	 250 
Power relays 	 40 
3. Class differences: 
Sensitive: Less than 100 milliwatts coil power 
General purpose: Contact rating of 10 amperes or less 
Power: Contact rating greater than 10 amperes 









100 1.00 4o 0.44 
90 0.90 3o 0.36 
80 0.80 20 0.30 
70  0.70 10 0.25 
60 0.61 dry circuit 
** 
50 0.52 (Not used) 0 
*Proper arc suppression required. 
**"Dry" circuit conditions (current less than 50 microamperes) 
constitutes a special case. If gold or paladium contacts are used, 
multiply by 1.0. Other contact materials in dry circuits are not 
recommended for general use. 
Failure rates for low population parts are given in Table 3.6. 
Reliability analysis can be classified into several different 
categories. First, a reliability analysis can be made soon after the 
design concept has been established by considering a rough estimate 
of the system reliability. This estimate can be used as design goals 
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TABLE 3.6 Average Failure Rates for Low Population Parts 
AVERAGE FAILURE RATE 
PART TYPE AND CLASSIFICATION 	 IN FAILURES/105 HOURS  
Accelerometers 	 1.0 
Batteries 	 0.01/cell 
Cells, Solar 	 0.001 
Crystals, quartz (MIL-C-3098B) 	 0.0076 
Gyros 	 5 
Heaters (crystal oven) 	 0.01 
Joints, solder (per connection) 	 0.00005 









(less than 0.001) 
0.001 
0.001 
Loads 	 Determine electrical 
Attenuators 	 and temperature stresses 
Fixed and use Figure 3.5 
Variable 
Thermistors 	 0.02 
NOTE: These failure rates are applicable only if the parts are 
replaced before their respective wearout periods. 
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for future analysis. Next, a reliability analysis can be made as the 
design becomes more definite as a result of a more accurate parts count. 
The next category of reliability estimates is when the pre-production 
and prototype units have been started to be built. An evaluation of 
the reliability could then be made of this particular design showing 
any weak areas that could be improved. A reliability estimate could 
be made as a result of laboratory and/or field test data, thus giving 
an estimate based on the test program. The last category could be a 
reliability analysis by using actual test data of the unit in the 
environment for which it is intended. 
An example will be given to demonstrate the methods used in 
obtaining a reliability prediction. The problem can be stated as 
follows: A communication satellite system is to operate for one full 
year in a synchronous orbit having a probability of success of 0.96. 
What is the optimum configuration if the basic elements in the system 
are as shown in Figure 3,15? The failure rates for each element 
are shown in Table 3.7. 
First all requirements must be defined. They are as follows: 
a) The physical environment - Van Allen radiation belt, ambient 
temperature, acceleration and vibration at launch. 
b) Continuous operation of the communication satellite. 
c) The satellite must operate without maintenance. 
d) Burn-in of 200 hours of satellite before launch. 
FIGURE 3.15 Basic Configuration of Communication Satellite 
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FAILURE RATES (X) 
BLOCKS 	 FAILURES/105 HOURS  
0.152 
2 	 0.142 
3 	 0.112 
4 	 0.045 
5 	 0.055 
6 	 0.262 
7 	 0.459 
8 	 0.266 
9 	 0.459 
J 	 0.065 
0.074 
L 0.067 




S2 	 0.148 
TABLE 3.7 Failure Rates for Communication Satellite System 




CONFIGURATION SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 	 OF SUCCESS  
1 	(1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.J.K.L.M.N) 	 0.637 
2 	[1.2.3.4.5.6.7.1LN] [any 5 out of 6 	 0.875 
strings of (8.9.J.K.L] 
3 	[1.2.3.4.5.6.7.M.N.6s1] [any 5 out of 	 0.648 
6 strings of (8.9.J.K.L)] 
4 	[1.2.3.4.5.6.7.M.N.6s2] [any 5 out of 	0.810 
6 strings of (8.9.J.K.L)] 
5 	[1.2.3.4.5.6.M.N•6S2] [any 1 out of 2 	0.842 
strings of (7)] [any 5 out of 6 strings 
of (8.9.J.K.L) 
6 	Same as configuration 5 except delete S2 	0.897 
7 	Same as configuration 6 except add N 	 0.908 
8 	rAny 1 out of 2 strings {[1.2.3.4.5.6] 	0.886 
[any 1 out of 2 strings of (7)] 
{[any 5 out of 6 strings of (8.9.3.K.L] 
[any 1 out of 2 strings of (N)] 
[S1.S2.M] see Figure 3.16 
9 	Same as configuration 8 except delete 	 0.973 
S
1 
 and S2 
TABLE 3.8 Different System Configurations for Satellite System 
Showing Probability f Success for One  Year 
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e) Pressure, humidity, and temperature to be controlled. 
f) Minimum power output to be used to provide longer life 
of the satellite. 
g) The frequency is to be specified. 
The next step is to develop a reliability model. This is shown 
in Figure 3.15 as a series string of elements. Then apply the 
reliability data to the model and find out if the design requirements 
have been met. Study various levels of redundancy so that the 
requirement could be met. 
By looking at Table 3.7, block 7 has the highest probability 
of failure (highest failure rate). A way must be found to reduce 
this failure rate. One way is to add another block 7 in parallel 
redundancy as shown in Figure 3.16 along with other elements in 
redundancy. Table 3.8 shows the reliability calculations for 9 
different configurations. 
It appears that configuration 9 is the optimum design. The 
reliability calculations are shown below using the configuration as 
shown in Figure 3.16 deleting S1 and S. 
First calculate the reliability of branch A for six elements 
functionally in series. The reliability is 
R
A =R1R2R3R4R5R6 1 2 3 5 6 
RA 





 = reliability of each element. 
Since for a constant failure rate R = e
-λt 
 where λ is the 
failure rate and t is the mission time the equation for RA becomes: 
Since branch A is in series with branch B which consists of two 
like elements "7" in parallel redundancy we must first calculate the 
reliability of this redundant configuration. The reliability of 
branch B is 
The reliability of branches A and B is therefore 
Branches C and D are identical to branches A and B respectively 
and are in parallel redundancy. Either A and B or C and D must 
operate. Therefore, the reliability of branches A and B or C and D is 
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Substituting the failure rates found in Table 3.7 
Next calculate the probability of success for branch E or R2. 
For one string of this branch 
Now any 5 out of 6 strings must operate, therefore 
Again substituting the failure rates found in Table 3.7 
R2  = 0.97774 
Now calculate the probability of success for elements M and N, 
R
3
. For element M0  
For element N one out of two must operate. The combined 
probability of failure QN is equal to 
94. 
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Substitute the failure rates found in Table 3.7 
Now the reliability of the complete system is simply 
Presented in this section was a way to perform reliability 
predictions and estimates. Actually there are several techniques 
that could be used. They will just be mentioned here for reference. 
. Predictions based on typical equipment classification, 
. Predictions using active element groups (AEG) count. . 
 Predictions by part count and nominal failure rate 
assignment. 
. Predictions by part count and assignment of failure rates 
as a function of stress levels. 
. Prediction methods based on MIL-R-26474, MIL-HDBK-217A, 
NAV SHIPS 93820, RADC Reliability Notebook, and MIL-STD-756. 
. Steady-state methods using algebra and matrix multiplication. 
. Transient methods using Markov chain method and Markov 
processes. 
. Monte Carlo Techniques of simulation. 
. Predictions by digital computer using the block diagram and 
the probability of success for each block as the input (also 
known as computer aided analysis). 
. Predictions based on figure-of-merit (FOM) or amount of 
experimental information received from the satellite while 
in orbit. 
. Predictions through determination and the adaptation of 
complexity factor ratings. 
These techniques while not precise are effective in reducing 
failures and increasing system reliability and are therefore an 




SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM 
This chapter will delineate the following reliability tasks as 
a continuation to the solution of the problem as stated in Chapter 3: 
. Parts, Material and Process Control. 
. Supplier Reliability Control. 
• Failure Reporting and Analysis, and Corrective Action. 
. Reliability Indoctrination and Training. 
. Reliability Testing Program. 
. Reliability Program Review. 
Parts, Material, and Process Control  
This task is essentially dealing with the reliability of parts, 
materials, and processes in the communication satellite system. Part 
failure modes and effects, mechanisms, and causes should be delineated 
in detail along with those factors in material and processing that are 
needed to assure a high degree of system reliability. It is the 
responsibility of the reliability department to have overall cognizance 
of this task. The department should supply necessary services to aid 
in the selection of component parts, establishing a preferred parts 
list, aid in the preparation of procurement specifications, analysis 
of component part reliability data, take part in vendor evaluation, and 
aid in reviews of a design and value analysis nature. 
The preferred parts list should identify all parts by a detailed 
procurement specification. This specification should include provisions 
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for reliability, quality control, and packaging. Component parts 
needed for a system such as a communication satellite are obtained 
by achievement of the following principles: 
. Design the component part for the specific environment. 
This includes choosing parts whose wear-out point is well 
beyond the required useful life. Limitations on the life of 
the component are effected by the space environment. The 
environment is divided into the following five major effects: 
magnetic fields, gravitational fields, vacuum, micrometeorites, 
and radiation. 
. Control of the manufacturing process. This includes control 
on three phases of product life: a) prevent marginal product 
from extending the period of early failures into the useful 
life region (see Figure 3.4); b) assure lowest failure rate 
during the useful life period; and, c) assure wear-out failures 
do not occur in the region of useful life. 
. Eliminate potential early failures by initiating screening 
tests. This will include all forms of environmental testing 
and operating tests under the expected conditions of the system. 
Table 4.1 shows some typical screening conditions. 
. Selection of most stable component parts as a result of the 
extensive and intensive testing program. 





Vibration (sinusoidal and random) 
Shock 




High Temperature processing 
TABLE 4.1 Typical Screening Conditions  
. Do not use new or untried types. This also applies to 
materials used in the manufacturing of the components. 
Use only those parts that have a sufficient background of 
proven part performance. 
. Adjustable components should be avoided due to severe 
vibration, mechanical shock, and acceleration seen during 
launch. 
• Avoid use of hermetically sealed parts filled with oils or 
electrolytes. These materials gas and build up very 
destructive pressures under the severe radiation environment 
seen in space. Materials for housing and structural use as 
well as coatings should also be chosen carefully for resistance 
to deterioration under electron and proton radiation. 
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. Such components as resistors, capacitors, and power trans-
formers, on which low pressure might have an effect were chosen 
so that they would operate under extremely low pressure (vacuum 
of space) without high temperature rise or other detrimental 
effects encountered in space. 
Table 4.2 shows the types of passive components used and their 
typical uses for a communication satellite. 
USE TYPE 
CAPACITORS 
General purpose, temperature 
compensation 
Ceramic 
Precision in low values Glass 
Precision in high values Mylar 
High values, small size Tantalum solid 
Precise tuning Glass and quartz 
tubular trimmers 
RESISTORS 
General purpose, low precision Carbon composition 
General purpose, moderate 
precision 
Pyrolytic carbon film 
High precision, high frequency Metal film 
High precision Wire wound 
Power dissipation Vitreous enameled wire 
wound 
INDUCTORS 
High frequency, general purpose (Nonmagnetic core, fixed) 
(Nonmagnetic slug, adjust-
able) 
Power frequency Permalloy dust core 
toroid 
Memory coils Ferrite core 
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TRANSFORMERS 
Narrow-band high frequency 
(tuned) 
(Nonmagnetic core, adjust- 
able inductance) 
(Magnetic core toroid) 
Broadband high frequency (Closed ferrite core) 
(Ferrite cup core) 
(Laminated magnetic core) 
Power frequency (Magnetic tape core toroid) 
(Permalloy dust core toroid) 
TABLE 4.2 Types and Typical Uses of Communication  
Satellite Passive Components  
One of the principles for selection of components was stated 
as to design the component for the specific environment because of 
the limitations of useful life imposed on the components due to the 
space environment. Delineated below are definitions of the major 
space environmental effects. 
Magnetic fields - The earth's magnetic field at the magnetic 
equator has a maximum horizontal flux component of 0.3 gauss. It is 
presumed that this field varies inversely as the cube of the distance 
from the center of the earth. As the distance increases, the earth's 
magnetic field becomes irregular, probably due to reaction with the 
magnetic component of the solar wind and plasma clouds. The magnetic 
flux densities of the order of magnitude found in the space environ-
ment will not have any noticeable affect on the mechanical properties 
of materials. However, sensitive meter movements and other devices 
which operate with low magnetic flux densities are affected. 
101. 
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Gravitational fields - The acceleration of gravity, g, may be 
calculated at any altitude, h, above the earth's surface by the equation 
where ro 
is the radius of the earth, and g is the acceleration of 
gravity at a distance r
o 
 from the center of the earth. The absence 
or reduction of the force produced by the earth's gravitational field, 
while having no affect upon electronic components or equipment, may 
have an appreciable affect on the operation of certain mechanical or 
electromechanical systems. For manned space flights, the physiological 
effects would require the greatest amount of consideration. 
Vacuum - The gas pressure in space is extremely low and measuring 
it is not feasible at the present time. Generally, the pressure at 
various altitudes is determined by calculations based on the ideal gas 
law and values of pressure at low altitudes where direct measurement 
is possible. Latest models of the atmosphere indicate approximate 
pressures of 10-5 mm mercury at 100 miles altitude and 6 x 10-11  mm 
mercury at 1000 miles. It is estimated that the pressure outside the 
solar system may be as low as 10-16  mm mercury. 
Low atmospheric pressure sublimates solids and evaporates liquids. 
Sublimation of metals may result in the condensation of these metals on 
electrical contacts and terminals causing arcing and short circuits. 
Plasticizers with high vapor pressures (used in many plastic materials) 
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may lose a great deal of mass due to evaporation, with resulting 
changes in structural properties. Moving metal parts operating in 
direct contact will lose their oxide coating, and in the vacuum of 
space these coatings will not re-form. Uncontaminated metal surfaces 
in direct contact may gall and seize. 
Micrometeorites- a  Micrometeorites are small particles of matter 
existing in outer space. They are considered to be debris from other 
bodies in the solar system. These particles are considerably larger 
than molecular size, and, generally are approximately a few microns in 
diameter. Most of these particles are thought to be of cometary origin, 
although some are believed to be fragments of asteroids. The velocity 
of the particles relative to the earth varies from about 11 to 72 
kilometers per second; however, accurate data concerning the density 
and mass of the particles and the number of particles impinging per 
unit area per unit time of a given mass are not available. The 
impingment of micrometeorites upon any solid surface will result in 
sputtering, erosion, and a general roughening of the surface. This 
change of surface characteristic will have its greatest affect on the 
thermal and optical properties of materials. 
Radiation - Radiation is defined as the combined processes of 
emission, transmission, and absorbtion of radiant energy. Radiant 
energy is composed of particle radiation and electromagnetic radiation 








Gamma rays (photons) 
The penetrating radiation environment of space may be due to a 




Solar flare radiation 
The effects of the space environment on electronic components 
that would be used in communication satellites are listed below. 
Semiconductor devices - The relatively low radiation tolerance 
of semiconductor devices sets them apart from other electronic components. 
With few exceptions, most transistors fail completely when subjected to 
an integrated dose of approximately 1013 neutrons/cm2 and 107  roentgens 
gamma radiation. Significant differences have been conclusively 
observed between the behavior of germanium and silicon transistors in 
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radiation fields, with germanium showing slightly more radiation 
resistance than silicon. Semiconductor diodes exhibit a greater 
neutron tolerance than do transistors; however, the gamma tolerance 







roentgens gamma radiation and were found 
to operate satisfactorily after irradiation. However, like most other 
semiconductor devices, permanent damage was clearly evident when these 
dose rates were increased by a factor of ten. Thermistors, which are 







roentgens gamma radiation. The 
useful life of a semiconductor device in a radiation field will depend 
on the circuit application or function required. Failure because of 
radiation does not usually appear as a sudden or abrupt change but 
rather a gradual change in characteristics. The following character-
istics have been noted in the irradiation of semiconductor devices. 
Transistors - Gamma radiation may cause permanent as well as 
temporary degradation if the total exposure becomes high enough. 
Current gain is decreased. Germanium devices are less sensitive to 
damage than silicon devices. Diffused-junction structures are less 
sensitive than alloyed-junction types. 
Diodes - Not affected to the same extent as transistors. Thin 
based-width devices are less sensitive than thick based width devices. 
Forward voltage at constant current increases and reverse resistance 
decreases, Diffused-junction structures are less sensitive than 
alloyed-junction structures. Germanium devices are less sensitive 
than silicon devices. 
Controlled Rectifiers - Data available indicates that these units 
can be used in a radiation environment of integrated fast-neutron flux 
on the order of 1014 neutron/cm
2 
 
Failures experienced are not catastrophic in nature but result 
from the increase in gate current required to fire until the gate-
cathode junction heating becomes excessive, 
Capacitors - Capacitors that use inorganic materials, such as 
glass, mica, and ceramic have exhibited the greatest resistance to 
radiation. Organic dielectric capacitors, polystyrene, polyethylene, 
and mylar are less satisfactory than the inorganics by about a factor 
of ten; however, they do offer a better capacitance-to-volume ratio. 
Paper - A 20 to 30 percent change in capacitance and minor 
changes in dissipation factor can be expected when exposed to a 
radiation of fast-neutron flux of 10
15 
 n/cm2 and gamma exposure of 
3 x 10
8 
roentgens. The combined effect of pressure build-up by 
high temperatures and radiation and the evaporation of the solder 




Ceramic - Available data for all types of ceramic capacitors 
indicates that no extensive degradation of electrical and physical 
characteristics can be expected from a fast-neutron flux of 2 x 10
15 
- 
n/cm 2 nd gamma exposure of 3 x 10
8 
roentgens. However, it is 
believed, that other environments such as ambient temperature and 
high vacuum may be more important for design considerations. 
Glass and Porcelain - The threshold of radiation damage has 
been estimated to be 10
5 
n/cm- fast-neutron flux and a gamma exposure 
of 109 roentgens. These types show more resistance to nuclear radiation 
than others; however, the effect of ambient temperature and high vacuum 
may be more important. 
Plastic - When this type of capacitor is irradiated in a fast-




and a gamma exposure of 3 x 10
8 
roentgens 
a 10 to 11J percent change in capacitance and a 3 percent change in 
dissipation factor can be expected. Teflon is not recommended as 
a dielectric, regardless of whether it is immersed in silicone oil. 
The limited information that is available concerning life expectancy 
and reactions to ionizing radiation fluxes indicates that polystyrene 
dielectric units will not perform satisfactorily. Existing data 
indicates that a mylar capacitor would perform better. 
-2 
Mica - When exposed to a fast-neutron flux of 10
15 
 n/cm and 
gamma energy of 3 x 10
8 
roentgens a capacity decrease of approximately 
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5 percent or less can be expected. However, the reliability of mica 
capacitors is approaching the level of ceramic and glass capacitors. 
Tantalum - Solid electrolyte tantalum capacitors are not expected 
to be impaired to any great extent in a combined environment of 100°C 
ambient temperature, high vacuum, and radiation levels of 5 x 10
13 
of cm-2 fast-neutron flux, and 7 x 10
8 
 roentgens gamma energy. The 
wet-foil tantalum capacitor has the same characteristics as the wet-slug 
tantalum capacitor and appears to be ideal for use in a high ambient 
temperature. Further study is required to determine the effects of 
nuclear radiation and high vacuum. Teflon is definitely not 
recommended for sealing purposes. 
Mylar - There is very little information available concerning 
effects of radiation, temperature, and high vacuum on the reliability 
of mylar capacitors; however, some advantages may be gained in place 
of paper capacitors. The effects of exposure to high vacuum would 
depend to a great extent on the quality of the glass seal. 
Oil impregnated - A 30 percent increase in capacitance and an 
increase in the dissipation factor can be expected in a radiation 
environment of fast-neutron flux of 10
15 




Connectors (Miniature) - The construction materials of 
connectors will determine their susceptibility to the effects of a 
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combined environment of radiation, high vacuum, and temperature. 
Elastomeric inserts, nylon boots, epoxy potting compounds, and 
compression glass-seal receptacles are organic materials which react 
unfavorably. When used in a high-vacuum environment, consideration 
must be given to the terminal spacing and the effect of corona 
ignition and extinction voltages. 
(Subminiature) - The same considerations as outlined above for 
miniature connectors apply; except that the effect of the reduced 
terminal spacing will present a greater design problem. 
Relays (Miniature and Subminiature) - The materials of construction 
will determine the reliability of relays in a combined space environment. 
Hermetically sealed units would be unsuitable for use in a high vacuum 
in view of the difficulties experienced with epoxy sealants. Since 
contact clearances are relatively small, corona ignition and extinction 
should also be considered. 
Inductors - The available information is incomplete to provide 
a reasonable estimate of the reliability of inductors in a combined 
space environment. However, the information that is available indicates 






and gamma energy of 10
10 roentgens. 
Transformers - The threshold of radiation damage to transformers 
is high in comparison to the effects on other components and materials. 
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The high-temperature environment imposes rigid requirements that 
preclude many insulation materials used in conventional transformers. 
The problem of high-vacuum effect and material diffusion should be 
given consideration. 
Resistors (Metal-Film) - In the construction of metal-film 
resistors, the film is deposited on the outer surface of a steatite 
tube and molded solid in a high-temperature plastic such as diallyl 
phthalate. As such, excellent reliability can be expected when 
exposed to an environment of high temperature and radiation. However, 
some units are constructed by depositing the film on the inner surface 
of a steatite tube and it appears that damage could be expected due to 
ionization of the trapped air. 
Carbon-Film - Basically similar in construction to metal-film 
resistors but differs mainly in resistive element materials. Because 
of the carbon-film, degradation becomes more a function of temperature. 
Carbon-film resistors are generally more sensitive to exposure than 
metal-film resistors. The effects of high vacuum on carbon-film 
resistors have not been thoroughly explored; however, a study of the 
basic materials indicate a better performance could be expected from 
metal-film resistors. 
Carbon Composition - This type of resistor is considered to be 
more susceptable to radiation damage than carbon-film. The threshold 
of radiation at which significant changes in resistance occur have 
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been estimated at 1014 n/cm-2 fast-neutron flux and 109  roentgens 
gamma energy. Some types of resistors are constructed with a pyrex 
glass which contains boron and is very susceptible to nuclear radiation. 
It would appear, however, that the construction of this type of 
resistor favors their use in a high-vacuum environment. 
Wire-wound - Power wire-wound resistors that are protected by 
vitreous enamel and subjected to an integrated fast-neutron flux of 
6 x 10
13 n/cm-2 and gamma energy of 10
8 roentgens have not been 
damaged. Units that are encased and/or coated with silicone resins 
are expected to operate satisfactorily at the same radiation levels 
although no information on the subject is presently available. 
Wire-wound accurate - These resistors, if used for accuracy 
and stability rather than to dissipate power, can be expected to 
perform well under a combined environment of radiation, temperature, 
and high vacuum. 
Thermistors - A limited amount of research has been conducted 
to determine the extent of radiation damage to thermistors during 
exposure to nuclear radiation. The results of some experiments have 
indicated that as far as voltage-current relations are concerned 
practically no measurable effects were noted after exposure to fast-




Varistors - Information concerning the effect of radiation on 
varistors or voltage-sensitive elements is not available. However, 
since most of the varistors currently used are selenium or copper-
oxide rectifiers, information of these elements can be substituted. 
In general, the semiconductor types of varistors can withstand nuclear 




without serious changes in their forward 
or reverse characteristics. Diodes fabricated from silicon carbide 
were found to be most radiation resistant, and it is hypothesized that 
these elements hold great promise for use in nuclear environments up 
17    -2 
to total integrated exposures of 10   n/cm 
Sensitive Microswitches - On the basis of available data it 
appears that the inorganic materials of which microswitches are con-
structed would not be seriously affected by nuclear radiation. However, 
the organic materials would be degraded in a vacuum where sublimation 
and evaporation would occur and the threshold of gamma radiation is 
estimated to be approximately 10
10 
roentgens. It is believed that a 
greater assurance of good performance in a combined environment will 
be achieved provided the organic materials used for insulation and 
plungers are fabricated from synthetic mica. Consideration should 
also be given to the corona ignition and extinction voltages when 
operated in a high vacuum. 
Thermostats - An examination of the basic construction materials 
from the point of view of radiation tolerance does not indicate rapid 
deterioration. Little information is available on the effects of high 
vacuum; however, it is believed that if thermostats with silver 
contacts are required to interrupt a reactive load, the metal spray 
may reach prohibitive proportions. Palladium or platinum should be 
considered for such applications. 
Coaxial Cables and Wire - Coaxial cables containing the poly. 
ethylene dielectric materials are believed to be satisfactory for 
the combined environment of 100°C temperature, high vacuum, and nuclear 
radiation. In a radiation environment above 10
10 
roentgens of gamma 
energy the polyvinyl chloride jacket will become hard and decrease in 
flexing capability. At high radiation levels and operation at high 
radio frequencies a slight increase in dielectric constant and a 
decrease in characteristic impedance can be expected. It is not 
considered advisable to use teflon dielectric cables because of their 
poor performance in a nuclear radiation and high-vacuum environment. 
It has been strongly recommended by most system application and design 
engineers that polyethylene-insulated hook-up wire be used wherever 
a combined environment is anticipated. 
Electron Tubes - These components fail when exposed to high-
intensity radiation fields due to damage to the glass envelope or 
glass-to-metal seals. Boron-free glasses show more resistance to 
radiation damage and can withstand integrated mixed fluxes as high as 
18 	-2 
10 n/cm-2 ; however, there are indications that an increase in 
fragility can be expected which might shorten the life of an 
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electronic device. The envelopes of subminiature and miniature 
vacuum tubes exhibit more resistance to nuclear damage than other 
glass-type tubes. This is mainly due to the reduction in bulk of 
the glass envelope and the size of metal-to-glass seals. 
The correct operation of gas tubes depends on maintenance of 
proper potentials and voltage drops across the tubes. The elements 
normally used in gas tubes react to nuclear bombardment in a manner 
similar to that encountered in vacuum-tube elements. The major cause 
of malfunction for gas tubes, excluding damage to glass-envelopes, is 
related to radiation effects on the gas. The gas is affected by gamma 
ionization and proton recoil ionization which often cause structural 
transmutation. 
Gamma radiation of 10
10 
roentgens causes appreciable physical 
damage only to electron tubes that depend for their main function 
upon light transmission through the envelope. Discoloration of glass 
greatly affects the operation of light-sensing devices. Radiation-
induced currents have been detected and these currents frequently exceed 
the photomultiplier's rated current. Tube sensitivities are greatly 
affected and can be attributed to glass discoloration. 
The use of magnetrons in a nuclear environment is limited by 
radiation damage to the glass-to-metal seals used in their construction. 
In applications involving ultra-high frequency principles, the dielectric 
constant of the various insulating materials greatly influences the 
operational characteristics. 
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If nuclear damage results in complete failure as would be 
encountered when the glass envelope of a tube fails, there is no 
point in considering the changes that occur in electrical operating 
characteristics. However, electrical changes, such as decreases in 
plate current, reduction of emission current, increases in control 
grid current, and changes in transconductance are design considerations. 
Coatings - The interest in coatings is a result of the need to 
develop more stable temperature-control coatings for satellites and 
space vehicles. Additives such as pigments, plasticizers, and other 
coating ingredients, as well as the type of surface on which the 
coating is applied, influences the radiation resistance of the coating. 
Table )4.3 gives radiation resistance of some coatings. 
COATING 	 GAMMA RADIATION RESISTANCE  
Phenolic 	 5 x 109 roentgens 
Silicone-Alkyd 	 1-5 x 109 roentgens 
Alkyd Enamels 
40% Phthalic Anhydride 
(MIL-D-5557) 	 1-5 x 109 roentgens 
32% Phthalic Anhydride 8 
(MIL-E-7729) 	 7-10 x 10 roentgens 
Epoxy 	 5-10 x 10
8 
roentgens 
Fluorinated Vinyl 	 5-10 x 10
8 
roentgens 
Nitrocellulose Lacquers 	5-7 x 10
8 
roentgens 
TABLE 4.3 Limits of Radiation Resistance of Selected Organic Coatings  
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The reliable application of component parts, materials, and 
process control in space application such as a communication satellite 
system, shows a present capability of withstanding the effects of space 
environment. As more sophisticated space missions are encountered for 
extended useful missions, more stringent requirements will be placed 
on the reliability of components and materials used in the space 
environment. 
Supplier Reliability Control  
This program task includes controlling vendor and subcontractor 
activities to assure their capability of furnishing components having 
the required reliability requirements. Some of the specific tasks 
included under this phase of the program are: 
. Supplier plant surveys 
• Supplier rating systems 
. Requiring suppliers to prepare written reliability program 
plans. 
Reliability personnel have the responsibility for the surveillance 
of the supplier reliability performance in the design and manufacturing 
of the end item. This surveillance is continued by participation in 
all design reviews at the supplier's facility and reviewing all 
activities that will have an impact on reliability. 
In order to perform an effective and timely supplier evaluation 
many factors come into play. Of prime consideration are the following: 
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. The supplier should have a well defined manufacturing setup, 
readily adaptable to fabrication of the high reliable product. 
. The supplier should have adequate personnel who are technically 
knowledgeable in designing, manufacturing and testing the product 
in accordance with the high reliability standards and specifica-
tions necessary for end product reliability integration. 
. The supplier should have adequate capacity for manufacturing 
and testing the product without the danger of slippage in 
delivery schedule. 
. The supplier should be able to supply sufficient test data, 
particularly life test and field test results, verifying the 
product's capabilities or limitations, and therefore enabling 
the criteria for failure rates. 
The supplier, in addition to the above considerations, must be 
willing to participate in a high reliability program financially. This 
will enhance his future programs in the space area as he becomes a 
qualified supplier for space environmental projects. 
The supplier rating system is a very useful tool to aid purchasing 
in maintaining and upgrading the quality of the product delivered from 
the supplier. As an example of the rating system let's consider the 
following: A rating of 75 would occur when the sample fraction 
defectives are equal to the specified acceptable quality level (AQL), 
with a maximum of 1 in 25 lots rejected. A rating of 60 would occur 
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when the sample fraction defectives equal 0.5 times the specified 
AQL's, with a maximum of 1 in 156 lots rejected. The AQL is defined 
as a nominal value expressed in terms of percent defective or defects 
per hundred units for a given group of defects of a product. 
The supplier's reliability program plan that is required by the 
prime contractor should include those items necessary for manufacturing 
the item so as to meet all of the high reliability requirements. It 
should include but not be limited to the following tasks. 
Design Reviews - held at supplier's facility with the 
responsible prime contractor personnel present. 
Production Control - to assure that the reliability achieved in 
design is maintained during manufacture. 
Reliability Test Program - tests should be designed to give 
confidence in the end item to meet expected environments. 
Reliability Analysis - made on a periodic basis of reliability 
achievement of the technical progress evaluations. 
Failure Reporting, Analysis, and Feedback - formalize a system 
for reporting, analyzing, and recommending corrective actions on all 
failures. 
Reliability Monitoring - to insure adequate development of 
reliability by analyzing the reliability status relative to the 
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requirements; by determining the corrective action needs; and by 
setting up a follow-up procedure on all corrective actions initiated. 
Only through a tight supplier reliability control program will 
the assurance be given that the items received from that supplier are 
indeed those items needed for a successful completion of the proposed 
mission. For a mission such as communications by satellite for periods 
in excess of 3 to 5 years, this task cannot be overemphasized enough. 
Failure Reporting, Analysis, and Corrective Action  
This next phase of the program plan is an integral part of the 
reliability effort for spacecraft systems. Although successful 
operation of the complete system is the ultimate goal that is sought, 
it adds very little feedback and information on which design improve-
ments can be made. If failures are encountered during manufacturing or 
qualification, acceptance, or reliability testing, these add much data 
necessary for an effort of improvement to the design. This feedback 
information of failure reporting, failure analysis, and corrective 
action is one of the essential ingredients of reliable product 
improvement. 
The failure reporting phase of this task should provide a closed 
loop system that is well monitored. It should report all failures on a 
timely basis so that failure analysis can be performed quickly, defining 
the cause of failure. As a result of the analysis, corrective action 
is instituted to assure against this type of failure recurring on 
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the system. Time is of the utmost importance in performing this task 
so as to implement necessary changes or rework on the system, thus 
increasing the probability of a more reliable system. 
A well formulated failure reporting system should have failure 
history records. These records serve two main purposes. First, the 
chances of the same problems occurring in future systems are minimized. 
(Solutions already obtained from part system failures should be in-
corporated into design review checklists as outlined in Figure 3.1 
under the task of Reliability Design Reviews). Second, an estimate 
of the reliability of the new system can be made realistically. For 
example, actual failure rates obtained under field or use conditions 
could be used in predicting or estimating the system reliability of 
similar units. 
The failure reporting system should provide the following infor-
mation as a minimum: 
. Component description, type 
. Serial number 
. Date entered production 
. Circuit reference number 
. Operational test time 
. Cumulative operational test time 
. On-off cycles 
. Cumulative on-off cycles 
. Serial numbers of next higher assembly 
121 
. Part number and serial number of components 
. Description of failure 
. Corrective action initiated and due date 
There are many types of failure reporting forms in use today. 
The features of some of these are described below: 
. Development Form. This gives detailed reporting of the 
failure that is at system detection, unit rework, and part 
failure analysis levels. This form is basically useful for 
low volume, detailed analysis, and manual data processing. 
. Flight Test Form. Similar to the development form for 
specialized subsystem field flight use. It is not as 
detailed in coverage as the development form but is suitable 
for low volume manual data processing. 
. Production Reliability Test Form. Specifically set up for 
reliability test failure reporting. This form features 
numerous combinations of cause-of-failure codes. Also 
corrective action follow-up is provided for timely feedback. 
. Field Failure Report Form. Designed for high volume military 
reporting where machine data processing is essential. One form 
is used per failure. 
. Industry Electronic Field Failure Report. This form classifies 
type of failure at system, subsystem, unit, and part levels. 
The type of failure code is stated on each form. Also field 
and supplier repairs and replacements could be documented on 
each form generated. 
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To simplify failure reporting a coding system should be set up 
and utilized. One such system could use a coding category as follows: 
. Parts classification code 
. Manufacturer's code 
. Part condition code 
. Symptom code 
. Mode of operation code 
. Environment code 
. Corrective action code 
. Cause of failure code 
. Responsibility code 
A failure analysis system is an essential part of the task and 
requires the reporting of all failures occurring during system 
production. Of primary interest during failure analysis are the 
following: 
. The failure cause should be identified for proper analysis 
and corrective action. 
. Determine overstress on other components due to the primary 
failure and to find out the effects of the overstress. 
. Initiate repair of failure and corrective action as necessary. 
All failure analysis should take into account the following 
procedures: 
. Appropriate system specifications and test data should be 
reviewed. 
123 
. Physical examination of the failed unit should be made before 
proceeding with failure analysis. Visual evidence will save 
time before analysis begins. 
. A verification of the reported failure should be made as soon 
as practical. 
. If necessary, extended tests should be made, such as radio-
graphic and/or infra-red. 
. The piece part should be dissected for further analysis if 
deemed necessary. Photographs or drawings should be prepared 
for clarification of the analysis. 
. Mode of failure should be determined at this point in time and 
corrective action recommended. 
The information requested for each failure analysis should 
include enough information for a complete description of the failure 
and corrective action. As a minimum the following is required: 
. Failure analysis report number 
. Failed part description 
. Program name 
. Date of failure 
. Major system and serial number 
. Major subsystem, serial number, and drawing number 
. Major module and serial number, drawing number and manufacturer 
. Failure verified/not verified 
. Lot quantity 
. Department reporting failure 
. Classification of failure (critical, major, minor) 
. Failed part environment (temperature, humidity, etc.) 
. Description of failure 
• Photographs and radiograph, file number, if any 
. Name of personnel preparing form and date 
. Name of personnel approving form and date 
. Corrective action instituted and date 
. Tests performed to confirm failure 
. Failure analysis 
. Corrective action and recommendations made. 
A flow diagram of a failure reporting, analysis, and corrective 
action system is shown in Figure 4.1. 
The depth of failure analysis could vary from somewhat trivial 
to a sophisticated and detailed one. During the period of a high 
reliability program such as the communication satellite system, many 
failures might occur which need to be analyzed, and corrective action 
implemented as required. Therefore, a well organized program is required 
to implement a failure reporting, analysis, and corrective action task 
on a timely basis. 
Reliability Indoctrination and Training  
The reliability of the communication satellite system will be 
enhanced if a comprehensive training and indoctrination program is 
FIGURE 4,1 Summary of Flow Failure Reporting, Analysis & Corrective  




initiated early in the program. Each functional group such as 
design engineering, production, procurement, quality control, and 
test engineering will contribute greatly to the reliability of the 
satellite system if each group knows the nature of its contribution 
and is so motivated to carry it out. The indoctrination and training 
program could consist of lectures, motion pictures, periodic bulletins, 
posters and displays, and a reliability training manual. Regardless 
of what method is used and training program is a continuing education 
process. 
The implementation of a reliability training program is based 
on many factors which are delineated below. 
First, who should be told about the importance of reliability 
and its effects on long-life systems such as a communication satellite? 
Every branch of the organization responsible for an effort in the high 
reliability requirements of the system should be made aware of the 
principles and practices of reliability fundamentals. Remember, it 
will be easier for a group to accept something new and helpful only 
if the group has a full understanding of the basic problem and an 
insight to its solution. A proper training program will make each 
group aware of the need, the methods, and the effect on themselves 
and their jobs. 
Secondly, why start a reliability training program? Basically, 
the reason is to develop an understanding of, and a desire to, achieve 
the fundamentals of reliability. There are many more reasons for 
starting a training program. They can be summarized as follows: 
. To make groups aware of the meaning and important signifi-
cance of reliability and methods for its control. 
. To make known to management the problems others are faced 
with in attempting to achieve a high level of reliability. 
. To emphasize the differences between short term and long 
term program goals, as far as the achievement of reliability 
is concerned. 
. To aid design personnel in diagnosing system and design 
problems. This can be worked in conjunction with the 
reliability design review task previously discussed. 
. To unify the entire organization into a team to achieve the 
goals set up in the reliability program. 
Thirdly, the question of what should be taught in the training 
programs must be answered. This depends on what level in the organ-
ization the training program is given. For top management personnel, 
the program should show the accomplishment of improving the company 
profit, reducing manufacturing costs, saving time, keeping up with 
schedule objectives and goals, and improving the customer-seller 
relationship. Top management is not interested primarily in the 
technical aspects of the program, but rather in the economic and 
financial phases. Middle management training courses should help 
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the group in performing better on the job, supply them with new 
techniques to aid their advancement, defining their responsibilities 
in the program for achieving the reliability objectives, help reduce 
costs and meet schedules better, and help in training their subordinates. 
The middle management personnel will understand the technical problems 
far better than top management personnel. Members of the technical 
staff such as design, industrial, production, and laboratory engineers 
should be trained emphasizing the following: 
. The technical, scientific and mathematical techniques to 
solve problems as encountered in reliability. 
. All the fine points and details with alternatives should be 
presented depending on the group taking the training. 
. Need for simplification of technical ideas when communicating 
with higher management who are not well versed in the technical 
aspects of the program. 
The training and indoctrination classes for the operating per-
sonnel, which includes manufacturing, assembly, inspection and test 
groups, should stress the following points: 
. Those opportunities which will be available after working 
on a high reliability satellite program. 
. Simplification of the job as a result of the training program. 
. Contribution of the training program to the job security. 
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Sophisticated technical language should be avoided, if possible, 
when presenting a topic. Moreover, when it is feasible, calculations 
should be simplified utilizing well known mathematical procedures. 
For a high reliability program such as the one for the communi-
cation satellite, training and indoctrination plans should be developed 
for the different levels of the organization involved. The following 
plans are presented as illustrative of what should be covered at the 
different organizational levels and the approximate time needed. 
For top management, the course should run for 8 to 10 hours 
spread out over 4 or 5 weeks (this is equivalent to one day per week 
for 2 hours per class). The general plan should cover the following 
subjects: 
. Need for the training program. 
. Principles of reliability. 
. Typical class problems and solutions. 
• Program organization. 
The middle management personnel course should run for approx-
imately 12 to 16 hours spread out over 6 or 8 weeks (this is equivalent 
to 2 days per week for one hour per class). The general plan should 
cover the same subjects as for top management only in more detail, 
especially the principles of reliability and class problems. 
The staff technical course should run for 20 to 40 hours spread 
over 10 or 20 weeks (this is equivalent to 2 days per week for one hour 
per class). The plan should include the following reliability 
disciplines: 
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. Need for the training program. 
. Principles of reliability. 
. Theory, methods, techniques, and class problems. 
. Program organization. 
For the operating personnel the training program should run for 
8 hours spread over 4 weeks (this is equivalent to 1 day per week for 
2 hours per class). The topics should include the need for a training 
program, general principles of reliability, and how the program will 
affect each one on the job. 
The classroom meetings could be supplemented by other techniques 
such as visual aids, blackboard work, charts, recordings, trips, plant 
tours, and training film. Training films seem to be most effective. The 
following is a partial list of films having a bearing on reliability that 
should be shown to the personnel working on high reliability programs. 
• "The Search for Reliability" - Standard Pressed Steel Co. - 
Primarily treats of fastener reliability and highlights the 
product rule. Standard Pressed Steel Co., Jenkintown, Pa. 
• "The Art of Soldering" - Boeing Airplane Co. - Reliability 
improvement through correct soldering techniques for printed 
circuits. Boeing Airplane Co., Seattle, Washington. 
• "10-9-8 Hold" - Boeing Airplane Co. - The abortion of a 
Bomark interceptor mission resulting from a single solder 
connection failure. - Boeing. Airplane Co., Seattle, Washington. 
131 
• "Tremendous Trifles" (Confidential) - Lockheed Aircraft Corp. - 
The high cost of poor workmanship and quality control. - Space 
Technology Laboratories, Los Angeles, California. 
• "The Closed Loop of Reliability" - Martin Co. - The need for 
failure reporting accuracy and an approach by the Martin Co., 
Denver. - Space Technology Laboratories, Los Angeles, California. 
• "Talos, Deadly Where Reliable" (Confidential) - Bendix Aviation - 
The importance of superior workmanship standards as an approach 
to reliability. - Chief, Technical Publications, Bendix Products 
Division - Missiles, Bendix Aviation Corp., Mishawaka, Indiana. 
• "Talos, Flight 440" (Confidential) - Bendix Aviation - A true case 
history of a flight failure. - Chief, Technical Publications, Bendix 
Products Division - Missiles, Bendix Aviation Corp., Mishawaka, 
Indiana. 
• "Rascal Project MX-776" (Confidential) - Bell Aircraft Corp. - 
Flight tests, both successful and unsuccessful, of the Rascal 
weapon system - Bell Aircraft Corp., Manager, Photographic Dept., 
Buffalo 5, New York. 
. "No Margin for Error" - Bell Aircraft Corp. - Designed for 
production workers, showing importance of each worker's contribution 
to overall system reliability. - Bell Aircraft Corp., Manager, 
Photographic Dept., Buffalo 5, New York. 
• "No Second Chance" - The story of how one weapon system - an 
interceptor missile - has been made reliable. - Air Force Film 
Library Center, Air Photographic - Charter Service, St. Louis 25, 
Mo. - Film #D0-59-41SEP456. 
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• "A Life in Your Hands" - Hughes Aircraft Co. - The importance 
of the indivual component part in a failure that caused a 
mission abort. - Public Relations & Advertising, Hughes Air-
craft Co., Culver City, California. 
• "The Prime Dimension" - Hughes Aircraft Co. - How a modern 
weapon producing organization engineers and builds reliability 
into its product. - Public Relations & Advertising, Hughes 
Aircraft Co., Culver City, California. 
. "A Synthesis of Standards" - Convair - The importance of 
standards and the strict adherence thereto as a means of obtaining 
high reliability. - Convair Division of General Dynamics, Pomona, 
California. 
• "The Price of a Goof" - Redstone Arsenal - The failure of a 
missile flight is traced from a solder joint to the abort. - 
U. S. Army Ordnance District, Dallas Regional Office, Dallas 2, 
Texas. 
• "The Priceless Component" - Hughes Aircraft Co. - The importance 
of the individual component parts to quality and reliability. - 
Public Relations Department., Hughes Aircraft Co., Culver City, 
California. 
Reliability Testing Program 
Reliability of the communication satellite system is an attribute 
that must be designed into it. As stated previously, reliability cannot 
be tested into the system, but rather testing could be used to evaluate 
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the design. Testing could be considered a design tool to find and 
eliminate the weak areas in the satellite system and thereby upgrade 
its quality. Reliability testing is necessary for the following 
reasons: 
. To verify that the design meets the performance requirements 
and has the required life expectancy. 
. To verify that hardware used previously is suitable in the 
new application. 
. Detecting and correcting failure modes as a result of the 
tests performed. 
. Monitoring reliability trends and evaluating the results of 
any changes. 
. Train personnel who will be responsible for the system during 
its launch and for data analysis and reduction. 
The environments that the satellite will encounter could be 
stated as: (a) prelaunch; (b) launch; and, (c) orbit. The environ-
mental conditions experienced by the communication satellite are shown 
in Table 4.4. 
PRELAUNCH 	 LAUNCH 	 ORBIT  
. Temperature & 	. Shock & Vibration 	. Space Vacuum 
Humidity 	 . Acceleration-Thurst, 	. Solar Radiation 
. Shock & Vibration 	Guidance, Wind Shear 	. 3°K Heat Sink 
. Handling 	 . Aerodynamic Noise 	. Earth Radiation 
. Sterilization 	. Aerodynamic Heating 	and Albedo 
1.34 
• R-F Radiation 	 Pressure Decrease 	. Radiation Belt 
. Storage Duration 	. Corona 	 & Solar Flares 
. Temperature 
Extremes 
. Cyclic Variation 
. Separation & 
Despin 
. Weightlessness 
. Attitude Control 
. No Air Darning 
. Magnetic Torques 
. Meteoroids 
TABLE 4.4 Environmental Conditions Experienced by 
Communication Satellites  
Testing has many concepts depending on the type of test being 
performed. Some of the more general concepts of the testing phase are 
given in Table 4.5. 
TEST TYPE 	 GENERAL PURPOSE  
Environmental 	Performance of system under environmental stresses. 
Failure 	 Failure mode determination, design margins. 
Life 	 Fatigue limit, time-to-failure. 
Special 	 Special conditions investigated. 
Specification 	Qualification, Acceptance, Production. 
Functional 	 Performance of system over short period under 
specified conditions. 
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Reliability 	Performance of system for a specified time 
under specified environmental conditions. 
TABLE 4.5 Concepts of Testing  
For the communication satellite system all parts will be elec-
trically and environmentally tested. All critical items used in the 
system will be screened for parameter drift. The high reliability 
testing program to be performed for the various components will now be 
delineated. The specific environments and various testing parameters 
are given in Table 4.6. 
Semiconductors - All parts to be burned-in for 1000 hours at 
maximum power. 
Electrical parameter drift measurements to be performed on all 
components, before, during, and after burn-in. For transistors, 
collector-base cutoff current, and DC current transfer ratio are 
measured. Measurements of emitter-base cutoff current, collector-
emitter saturation voltage, and a breakdown voltage parameter are 
required. For diodes, leakage, forward voltage, and breakdown voltage 
are to be screened. 
Samples from each type are subjected to environmental, life, 
and temperature cycling tests in accordance with the applicable 
component specification. 









Resistance to Sildering Heat 
Low Temperature Operation 
Short Term Overload Solderability 












Tantalum X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Glass X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Ceramic X X X X X X X X 
X X X 
Resistors 
Composition 
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Metal film X 
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Wirewound X X X X X X X X X X 
X X X 
Crystals  X 
X X 
X 





X X X 
 X 
X X X X 
Relays X 
X X 
X X X X X X 
Fuses X X X X X X X X X X X X X 






























Wire and cable  X X  X 
X X X  
X 
Connectors X 
X X X X X X X X X X 






Capacitors - All capacitors receive a load life (burn-in) test for 
a specified voltage, temperature, and time. 
to the following: 
Specifications to be similar 
Tantalum Rated voltage, 25°C, 250 hours 
Ceramics & Glass Rated voltage, 25°C, 100 hours 
Mylar Foil Rated voltage, 85 °C, 100 hours 
Mica Rated voltage, 150°C,  50 hours 
Capacitance, dissipation factor, and leakage (or dielectric resist-
ance) measurements are made before and after burn-in tests. The parameters 
must meet the original specification requirements when measured after burn-in 
and capacitance and dissipation factor must remain within specified limits. 
Sample capacitors taken from each lot are subjected to temperature 
and immersion cycling, vibration, shock, moisture resistance, corrosion, 
high vacuum, and temperature storage. 
Resistors - All components require a 100-hour load life (burn-in) 
at an ambient temperature of 25 ± 5°C and at a wattage dissipation that 
raises the resistor hot spot temperature to its maximum rated value. 
Resistance measurements are made before and after burn-in test. 
The resistant value after burn-in must be within the original tolerance 
limits of the specification and the resistance must not exceed a 
specified value. 
Samples of each type are subjected to the following tests: over-load 
test, resistance temperature characteristics, temperature cycling. 
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Special reliability testing will be conducted on selected components 
to derive failure rates, failure modes and effects, and any parameter 
variations. The critical components to be tested are the tunnel diode 
amplifier and the traveling wave tubes, both essential units used in a 
communication satellite. 
The reliability testing program for the tunnel diode amplifier 
will now be given. Basically, the tunnel diode amplifier uses germanium 
tunnel diodes, an impedance matching and biasing circuit, and a microwave 
circulator. The reliability testing program is composed of tests, 
screening procedures, and analysis to assure the reliability goals have 
been met. The necessary steps in performing the tunnel diode amplifier 
tests are as follows: 
. Diode Matrix Test. Reveal the potential failure modes by 
using screened assemblies to determine the diode's response 
to temperature and power with high stress. This will generate 
data useful in the parameter drift screening sequence and 
give valuable information on failure rate estimates. 
. Microwave Circulator Stress Test. Determine the circulator 
response to temperature extremes thus revealing potential 
failure modes. 
. Germanium Diode Life Test. Test under operational conditions 
for a specified time period thus obtaining an estimate of the 
required failure rate. 
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. Parameter Drift Screening. Screening of parts on a 100 percent 
basis to reveal potential failures in the unit. This is to be 
performed on all diodes undergoing the life test and all 
amplifiers to be used in the satellite. 
. Qualification Test. The tunnel diode amplifier will be 
evaluated under the actual space environment to give confidence 
in the reliability performance under launch and orbit conditions 
(vibration, shock, radiation, high vacuum, humidity, and 
acceleration). 
The tunnel diode screening procedure will entail measuring the 
diodes for peak current, peak voltage, valley current, series resistance, 
and resistive cutoff frequency. The criteria for failure will be if 
the peak-current, peak voltage, or series resistance changes more than 
10 percent or the resistive cutoff frequency changes more than 15 percent. 
The tunnel diodes will be temperature cycled from 25°C for twenty-
four hours to -20°C for twenty-four hours. Next the diodes will be 
vibrated ultrasonically for approximately 10 minutes for the purpose 
of accelerating imperfections in the junction. Electrical measurements 
are then made of peak current, peak voltage, series resistance, and 
resistive cutoff frequency. A second temperature cycling test is next 
performed at 80°C for twenty-four hours, 25°C for twenty-four hours, 
and -20°C at twenty-four hours. A second ultrasonic vibration is 
conducted to stress all components associated with support of the diode. 
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A temperature cycling and burn-in test is then performed over a 
temperature range of +60°C to -20°C, holding at +60°C for twenty-four 
hours, at 25°C for twenty-four hours, and at -20°C for an additional 
twenty-four hours. Measurements of the peak current will be made at 
each temperature stated above. This temperature cycling test will 
continue for a period of 3 months. At the conclusion of the test 
final measurements will be taken of the peak current, peak voltage, 
valley current, series resistance, and resistive cutoff frequency. 
The tunnel diode amplifier qualification test procedure will now 
be given in accordance with the detailed environmental specification. 
Pre-environmental tests - Each amplifier will be checked per test 
specification for noise figure, gain and bandwidth measurement, saturation 
level, mismatch, VSWR (voltage standing wave ratio), and DC current drain. 
Each unit shall meet the requirements of the tunnel diode amplifier 
specification. 
Temperature tests - The tunnel diode amplifiers will be placed 
in temperature chambers and subjected to three temperature cycles. 
A temperature cycle will consist of a low temperature exposure 
of 24 hours and a high temperature exposure of 24 hours. The transitions 
between temperatures shall take three hours and the rate of change of 
temperature shall be no greater than one degree per minute. The law 
temperature shall be -30°F, and the high temperature +140°F. 
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Post temperature electrical test - The test described in Pre-
environmental tests above shall be repeated at room ambient temperature. 
Humidity test - The tunnel diode amplifiers shall be placed in a 
humidity chamber and subjected to five twenty-four hour cycles. The 
cycles shall consist of raising the temperature over a two-hour period 
to 120°F, holding it at 120°F for six hours, and lowering the temperature 
over a 16-hour period to 68°F. The relative humidity shall be held at 
95% + 0% - 10% over the cycle. Post humidity electrical tests described 
in Pre-environmental tests shall be repeated on the units immediately 
after the completion of the fifth humidity cycle in room, ambient 
temperature. 
Launch vibration test - The tunnel diode amplifiers shall be 
subjected to a random vibration test to simulate launch conditions. 
The sweep rate shall be 1-1/4 octaves per minute. The amplifiers shall 
be mounted as they normally would be and vibrated in each of the three 
mutually perpendicular axes. 
Launch shock test - Each of the amplifiers shall be shock tested 
once in one plane. The shock shall be 100G ± 10G, for 6.5 millisecond, 
half sine shock wave. Electrical test after vibration and shock as 
described in Pre-environmental tests shall, be repeated on each of the 
amplifiers. 
Launch vibration and shock endurance - The tests described in 
Launch vibration test and Launch shock test are considered to simulate 
one launching of the satellite on the tunnel diode amplifier. These 
tests will be repeated on each amplifier ten times. The units will 
then be electrically tested per Electrical test after vibration and 
shock after each launch simulation. 
Orbital environment stress test - This test will check the ability 
of the tunnel diode amplifiers to operate in a vacuum and with the 
temperature cycling expected in orbit. 
Criteria for failure - The tunnel diode amplifier shall be 
considered to have failed if the following parameters are not met: 
Noise figure 	 5.0 db maximum 
Bandwidth 	 ± 5 me 
Gain variation 	 ± 0.1 db over any 60-mc range 
within 250-mc bandwidth 
Gain stability 	 ± 0.4 db 
Maximum slope at any 	± 0.1 db/mc 
frequency over the 
bandwidth 
Departure from 	 1 db max at -22 dbm output 
linearity 
DC current 	 ± 10% initial value. 
The following test data for orbital environmental stress test 
shall be recorded for each tunnel diode amplifier: 
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Noise Figure  
NF at center frequency -125 mc 	 db 
NF at center frequency -75 mc 	 db 
	
NF at center frequency -25 mc   db 
NF at center frequency +25 mc   db 
NF at center frequency +75 mc  db 
NF at center frequency +125 me   db 
Gain at Center Frequency   db 
Bandwidth 
Lower 3-db point 	 mc 
Upper 3-db point 	 mc 
Gain Variation  
Maximum variation over 60 mc 	 db 






-125 mc 	 Center 	 -125 in 
Frequency 
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Saturation Level  
Point of departure of -1 db 	 dbm 
output level 
Mismatch 
Stable over range 
VSWR 	 Input 	Output  
VSWR at center frequency -125 me 
VSWR at center frequency -50 mc 
VSWR at center frequency +50 mc 
VSWR at center frequency +125 mc 
Pre-environmental test - Each amplifier will be checked per test 
procedures for noise figure, gain and bandwidth, saturation level, 
mismatch, VSWR, and DC current drain. 
Vacuum test - Install feedthroughs and cables for the amplifiers 
in the vacuum chamber using 50-ohm bulkhead feedthroughs. Check the 
resulting cable assemblies for VSWR, a maximum of 1.05 is allowable. 
The DC power is brought out through a suitable bulkhead fitting. Install 
the tunnel diode amplifiers in the chamber, mounting the amplifiers on 
temperature controlled panels. Perform on each tunnel diode amplifier 
the noise figure, gain, bandwidth, gain variation, saturation level, 
and DC current tests. Start the pump down to 1 x 10-5 mm Hg and 
maintain the temperature control panel at +70°F with all amplifiers 
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operating. As the chamber pressure is reduced the gain shall be 
monitored and measured at 5-minute intervals using the output indications 
of the crystal detectors. After the chamber pressure has been reached 
1 x 10-5 mm Hg, measure the noise figure, gain, bandwidth, gain variation, 
saturation level, and DC current. Continue operating the amplifiers at 
1 x 10-5 mm Hg with a base plate temperature of 70°F. Monitor the gain 
except when amplifier is being electrically tested. Measure the noise 
figure, gain, bandwidth, gain variation, saturation level, and DC current 
on each amplifier on an hourly basis. Continue this test for 21. hours 
or until any instability of amplifier characteristics have stabilized. 
Thermal vacuum temperature cycling - Continue operating the 
amplifiers at 1 x 10-5 mm Hg while temperature cycling the base plate 
temperature. The base plate temperature shall be cycled over a temperature 
range of +30°F to 90°F. The temperature shall be changed at a rate of 1 
degree per minute, being increased to 90 °F in one hour and reduced in 
one hour to 30°F. This cycle shall be repeated throughout this test. 
Monitor the gain of each amplifier. During the first temperature cycle, 
monitor and measure the noise figure of the number one tunnel diode 
amplifier over the temperature cycle. On the second cycle repeat the 
same measurement on number two tunnel diode amplifier. In similar fashion 
measure the remaining amplifiers. 
During the second cycle measure the gain, saturation level on the 
number one amplifier over the temperature cycle. On the third cycle 
repeat the same measurement on the number two tunnel diode amplifier. 
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In similar fashion measure three on the next cycle and onto the 
last amplifier. 
This test will give a set of data on how the tunnel diode 
amplifiers are affected by temperature while in a vacuum. From 
the data the most meaningful point in the temperature cycle will 
be determined for electrical testing of the tunnel diode amplifiers. 
The test will be continued through 1000 temperature cycles. The 
gain of the amplifiers will be monitored throughout the test when other 
measurements are not being made. On a weekly basis measurements of 
noise figure, gain, gain variation, bandwidth, saturation level, and 
DC current shall be made on each amplifier. At 250 cycles, 500 cycles, 
750 cycles, and 1000 cycles the noise figure, gain saturation level, 
bandwidth, gain variation shall be measured over a complete temperature 
cycle on each tunnel diode amplifier. Use the same procedure as used 
on the first one to thirteen cycles of this paragraph. Throughout 
this test check for any change in electrical response or temperature 
response. Any small change should be studied for early indication of 
an unknown failure mode. 
The traveling wave tube is used to generate output power in the 
communication satellite and is required to function without failure for 
a much longer period of time than the life of ordinary tubes. It is 
also expected to withstand the severe mechanical stresses during the 
launch of the satellite. 
The characteristics of a typical traveling wave tube are given 
in Table 4.7. 
Anode voltage 	 1770 volts 
Cathode current 	 17 ma 
Cathode current density 	 85 ma/cm2  
Collector power, including 
helix and anode 	 12.5 watts 
Collector voltage 	 740 volts 
Gain, at saturation 	 35.5 db 
Gain, low level 	 41 db 
Heater power 	 1.5 watts 
Helix voltage 	 1540 volts 
Operation point 	 0 dbm input 
saturated output 
Output power, minimum 	 3.5 watts 
Weight 	 7.1 pounds 
TABLE 4.T Satellite Traveling Wave Tube Characteristics  
The reasons for using traveling wave tubes to generate output 
power in the satellite are as follows: 
. The efficiency of the traveling wave tube is much higher 
than solid-state devices for generating power at frequencies 
of a few thousand megahertz. 
147 
148 
. The weight of the solar cells needed to give power for the 
solid-state device would offset the decrease in weight from 
that of the traveling wave tube. 
. The traveling wave tube has a higher gain over other tubes 
such as triodes, which would require two or more stages to 
generate the same power output as the traveling wave tube. 
The cathode of the traveling wave tube usually operates at a 
temperature of between 725 °C and 800°C. Every 20°C reduction in 
cathode temperature doubles the life of the tube. The tubes used in 
the satellite have been estimated to have mean time between failures 
of 7 or 8 years. Past experience revealed a peculiar thermal problem 
of the tube in space. When the tube was put in a vacuum to simulate 
space environment it developed characteristics that were unfavorable 
for reliable operation. There was presence of output ticks less than 
1 db in amplitude and 1 millisecond in duration. No knowledge was 
known at the time of what effect the ticks would have on the useful 
life of the tube. Extensive research on the problem related the cause 
with hot spots which resulted in the emission of gas to such an extent 
that the gas became ionized, thus producing a low impedance path, 
forming an arc. This was eliminated by a pressurized design in which 
all high voltage points outside the traveling wave tube were operated 
at atmospheric pressure in an enclosed chamber. 
The reliability testing program on the traveling wave tubes is 
delineated below. It is designed to accumulate data which will provide 
the required confidence needed in the communication satellite design. 
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Prelaunch and launch environmental tests - Prelaunch and launch 
environmental tests will be conducted on both the high-level and low-
level traveling wave tubes to verify the ceramic-to-metal seal and 
end cap design, and the capabilities of the tubes to survive all 
launch environments. 
Accelerated cathode life tests - This test will provide confidence 
in the estimated cathode wearout life estimate of over 100,000 hours. 
This test is designed to obtain data at several points on the acceleration 
wearout life curve which will allow extrapolation at normal operating 
conditions. The test is based on cathode temperature and the general 
rule that cathode life is doubled for each 20°C decrease in temperature. 
Each of the low-level and high-level cathodes in the gun structure 
will be connected such as to allow diode operation of the cathodes. Each 
of the cathodes will be operated at three different temperatures to 
obtain three points on the wearout curve. The data will then be extra-
polated to the normal operating conditions. The test duration is for 
one year. 
Traveling wave tube reliability test - A qualitative reliability 
test will be run on the low-level tubes and on the high-level tubes. 
This test will be a multiple purpose test. The first purpose will be 
to parameter drift screen flight traveling wave tubes. The second 
will be to generate reliability data for failure rate demonstration. 
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All traveling wave tubes will be placed in life test racks and will 
be electrical performance tested every 200 hours. The data will be 
analyzed for the parameter drift, population trends, and individual 
trends. As tubes are needed for the flight program those which are 
closest to the population norm and exhibit the least drift will be 
chosen. The flight tubes selected will have a minimum of 3,000 
hours of operation and a maximum of 12,000 hours. Twenty tubes of 
each type tube plus the flight tubes, the engineering model tubes 
and the critical item environmental test tubes will be placed in 
this qualitative reliability test. Operating this phase of the test 
in this manner has the advantage of allowing the selection of the 
best tubes from a large population of space qualified tubes for the 
flight satellites. 
Reliability life tests will also be performed on other critical 
components and subsystems in the satellite system. One of the sub-
systems is the despin subsystem. Reliability life testing of the 
despin subsystem will be conducted on the two subsystem elements 
separately: the electronics unit and the pneumatic assembly. Tests 
will be performed on two electronics units containing the rate gyros 
and on one pneumatic assembly consisting of the pressure regulator 
and relief valve, two solenoid valves, high and low pressure trans-
ducers and associated plumbing. 
The two electronics units will both be subjected to acceptance 
level vibration tests and functionally tested before and after vibration. 
The two units will then be subjected to a vacuum environment for 
a period of 6 weeks. One unit will be operated once each day 
simulating flight requirements of 20 minutes despin time followed 
by 10 minutes venting time. The second unit will be vacuum soaked 
for 3 weeks, then operated once each day for the remaining 3 weeks. 
These tests will provide a confidence level for the operational 
capability of the units. 
The acceptance test vibration level is shown below: 
Frequency Range 	 Vibration Level 
10 to 300 hertz 	 2g 
300 to 2000 hertz 	 3g 
The vibration shall be in the 3 mutual perpendicular axes of 
the unit and the displacement shall be 0.4 inch double amplitude 
maximum. The input vibration sweep rate shall vary at a rate of 
4 octaves per minute. 
The components of the pneumatic assembly will be tested to 
verify the operational requirements. This assembly will be placed 
in a vacuum environment for a period of 2 months. Leakage of 
the assembly will be monitored for one month. The assembly will 
then be operated to simulate operational flow requirements of 20 
minutes despin time followed by 10 minutes of venting tine, once 
each day for the second month. System parameters of flow, regulated 
pressure and leakage will be monitored for this period. 
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Reliability testing of the combined power control assembly and 
traveling wave tube converters will be performed. Two power supplies 
will be used to simulate the tapped solar array. One of the power 
supplies will be programmed to reduce its output periodically to 
simulate solar eclipses and exercise the traveling wave tube under-
voltage protection circuits. These simulated eclipses will be 
repeated at two-hour intervals to approximate the total number of 
eclipses during five years in orbit within the first six months of 
testing. Resistive loads will be used to simulate the traveling wave 
tube converter loads. 
The test setups will be energized and operated continuously for 
six months with mounting plate temperatures maintained at nominal 
satellite operational conditions. The periodic test measurements will 
be performed on a weekly basis. Daily checks will be made to verify 
continuous system operation. After the initial six months, step-stress 
testing with 10°C mounting plate temperature increases at one-month 
intervals will be performed until failures occur. 
Qualification tests will be conducted on all spacecraft assemblies. 
Five major environmental exposures are planned for assembly qualification. 
. Humidity. Humidity tests will be conducted on those assemblies 
which will not be protected from a damp atmosphere during 
handling, shipping and storage, or which may be adversely 
affected by high humidity during launch operations. After 
stabilization in a temperature and humidity chamber the 
assembly will be exposed to the specified humidity conditions 
for 50 hours. Subsequently the performance of the assembly 
will be checked. 
. Vibration. Assemblies will be vibrated in each of three 
orthogonal directions, with one direction parallel to the 
thrust axes. Attachment of the assembly to the test apparatus 
will simulate the actual attachment of the assembly to the 
spacecraft structure. The assembly will be tested in the 
operational condition normal for the launch phase of the 
mission. The vibration tests will include sinusoidal and 
random motion vibration (complex wave) and sinusoidal sweep 
mode response tests. 
. Acceleration. The assemblies will be attached to a mounting 
fixture simulating attachment to the spacecraft structure and 
attached to the acceleration equipment such that the accel-
eration is in the direction of the resultant of the thrust 
and spin accelerations applied to the assemblies. The 
acceleration levels will be maintained for at least 3 minutes 
for each assembly. The assembly will be in the operational 
condition occurring during boost. 
. Thermal-vacuum. Thermal-vacuum tests will be performed with 
the assembly mounted in a manner thermally simulating the 
attachment of the assembly to the spacecraft structure. 
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During evacuation the assembly will be operated in the 
condition typical of the launch phase; corona effects will 
be monitored throughout the evacuation period. Tests will 
be conducted under stabilized exposure of 48 hours with the 
assembly operating. For cyclically-operated assemblies 
cold start capability will be demonstrated during the 
48-hour exposure. Performance of the assembly will be 
verified throughout and after the exposure. 
Shock. Nine shocks (three shocks along each of the three 
coordinate axes) will be applied to each assembly through 
the normal mounting provisions of the assembly. 
After successful integration, the satellite will be subjected 
to specified environmental conditions. The spacecraft environmental 
qualification phase of the test program commences with mass properties 
determination and concludes with the acceptance. The mass properties 
and magnetic properties of the spacecraft will be measured as part of 
the environmental qualification test program. Five major environmental 
conditions for the spacecraft are as follows: 
Vibration. While in the launch mode, the spacecraft will be 
subjected to separately applied sinusoidal and random vibrations 
in each of the three orthogonal directions. The vibration 
will be applied and measured at the spacecraft separation plane. 
Equipment performance will be monitored. After the test, the 
spacecraft will be subjected to a post-vibration functional 
check to search for failure, malfunction, or out-of-tolerance 
performance degradation. 
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. Humidity. The spacecraft will be installed in a temperature 
and humidity chamber. After stabilization the spacecraft will 
be exposed to the conditions for 21i hours. The spacecraft will 
then be removed and its operational performance checked. 
. Spin. The spacecraft in its launch configuration will be 
subjected to a spin test, including spin-up and de-spin tests. 
The spacecraft will be in an operational status normal for 
powered flight. While in its orbital injection flight con- 
figuration and operational mode, the satellite will be subjected 
to a spin rate of 12 rpm and maintained at this rate for sufficient 
time to exercise all functional subsystems. 
. Temperature. While in a nonoperating condition, the spacecraft 
will be exposed to the temperature range specified by the design 
margins. After the spacecraft is returned to ambient conditions, 
it will be tested for failure or out-of-tolerance conditions. 
. Thermal-vacuum. Thermal-vacuum tests will be performed to 
verify the thermal design and to demonstrate performance 
capability beyond the temperature range to be encountered in 
flight. Tests will be conducted under stabilized pressure 
conditions with simulated solar illumination of the spacecraft 
and with the chamber walls cooled. The spacecraft will be 
operated in all modes of normal operation which are controlled 
by ground command. During the test all operable equipment will 
be cycled through its maximum thermal excursion. The spacecraft 
will be rotated at a rate sufficient to stabilize the temperature 
of the solar array. The test will last for 2 weeks. 
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The following tests are also to be performed to qualify the 
design of the satellite. 
. Balance. The spacecraft will be balanced before environmental 
tests so that the effect of balance weights is included. 
• Weight, Center of Gravity, and Moment of Inertia. While 
non-operative, the spacecraft weight, center of gravity, and 
moments of inertia (about the spin axis and the maximum and 
minimum moments about the transverse axes) will be determined 
and compared with design requirements. 
. Magnetic Properties. Magnetic measurements of the fully 
assembled and operating prototype spacecraft will be made. 
. Electromagnetic Compatibility. Electromagnetic compatibility 
tests will be performed as a part of systems performance tests 
to verify that all subsystems are capable of compatible 
operation. RF susceptibility tests will be made on a concurrent 
basis to provide information on the interference profile of the 
spacecraft. 
Acceptance tests will be performed on all flight spacecraft to 
see that performance requirements have been met, that the equipment is 
free from workmanship defects, and that it will survive the flight 
environments. 
Acceptance tests for subsystems consist of environmental exposures 
at those levels considered adequate to detect workmanship defects and 
provide a simulation of the launch and orbital environment. 
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The environmental exposures during the acceptance tests differ 
from qualifications tests in that only two stresses are considered, 
vibration and thermal-vacuum. 
. Vibration. Only sinusoidal vibrations will be applied. 
. Thermal-vacuum. Thermal-vacuum tests will be performed with 
the assembly mounted in a manner thermally simulating the 
attachment of the assembly to the spacecraft structure. 
Tests will be conducted at maximum and minimum predicted 
assembly temperatures. During evacuation the assembly will 
be operated in the condition typical of the launch phase; 
corona effects will be monitored throughout evacuation. Tests 
will be conducted under stabilized temperature and pressure 
conditions for a minimum exposure of 24 hours with the assembly 
operating. For cyclically-operated assemblies cold start 
capability will be demonstrated during the 24-hour exposure. 
Performance of the assembly will be verified throughout and 
after the exposure period. 
After successful integration, the satellite will be subjected 
to specified environmental conditions. Two major environmental 
exposures for satellite acceptance are as scheduled below. In 
addition, the mass and magnetic properties of the satellite will be 
determined as part of the acceptance program. 
. Vibration. The flight spacecraft will be vibrated in each 
of three orthogonal directions, with one direction parallel 
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to the thrust axis. The control accelerometer for these 
tests will be tested in the operational condition normal 
for the launch phase of the mission. Separate sinusoidal 
and random excitation will be applied in sequence. 
. Thermal-vacuum. The spacecraft will be placed in the space 
simulation chamber and while it is being operated in the 
normal space mode will be exposed to an environment simulating 
that expected during the mission. Vacuum, solar radiation, and 
the heat-sink condition of space will be approximated. These 
conditions will be maintained sufficiently long to permit 
complete testing of the spacecraft. 
As can be seen from the extensive testing program, much effort 
goes into a satellite system which requires a high degree of reliability. 
The testing phase is an activity of qualifying the system by means of 
space environmental simulation. This simulation is used to answer 
many questions and give solutions to numerous problems encountered 
during the design and development of the communication satellite. 
To be effective, the reliability testing program must be 
completely integrated. This is best obtained by a single engineering 
group. Since the methods and techniques used are those associated with 
the reliability discipline, the reliability group seems the logical choice. 
One approach that satisfies most of the test planning requirements 
is based on two analyses. These are pretest analysis and test emphasis 
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analysis. The pretest analysis determines the needs of the program, 
such as the different types of tests needed to be performed on 
components, subsystems, and the complete system. The test emphasis 
analysis determines the elements of the testing program, such as 
requirements for test sample size, scheduling requirement and cost 
requirement constraints. 
In addition to the types of tests mentioned in Table 4.5, there 
is another type: step-stress testing. The main reasons for this 
testing technique are as follows: 
. To detect process change measurements of process improvement. 
. To determine maximum ratings of the device being tested. 
. To determine maximum application stresses. 
. To establish the necessary levels of screening. 
The step-stress method of testing is ideal for devices that are 
prone to fail because of threshold (as opposed to time dependent) 
failure mechanisms. The stress is applied to the device to which 
the failure mechanism is most likely to occur in equal steps until 
failure. A frequency distribution is then plotted of stress levels 
versus devices that failed. From this the process average and process 
control can be determined. 
It should be noted that in applying this technique of testing, 
consideration must be given as to whether the failures that occur 
at any step are ascribable to the same failure mechanism. To 
160 
accomplish this a detailed failure analysis is required as described 
previously. Consideration must also be given as to whether the 
failure mechanisms change with increasing stress levels. 
The saving of time and money is realised by employing the 
step-stress technique as compared to life testing. For instance, 
in testing 10,000 transistors at a high reliability level, a 10,000 
hour life test would be required with one failure. If the step-stress 
testing technique were used only 100 transistors need be tested for 
approximately 100 hours with 100 failures. If failures did occur, 
by employing a timely failure analysis to each failure, information 
would become available for improving the devices being tested, its 
applicability to the next level of assembly, and the screening methods 
used in remaining irregularities. 
A method used extensively today in finding components that are 
prone to failure is nondestructive testing. This type of reliability 
testing is designed to identify devices that are likely to fail when 
put into operation without destroying or harming the device. The 
nondestructive tests are classified into several categories: mechanical, 
electrical, thermal, visual, and radiographic. 
The mechanical tests include the following: 
. Vibration. Check weak parts of structure, resonance points, 
and intermittent conditions. 
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. Shock and Acceleration. Evaluate physical integrity of 
devices by subjecting it to stresses that could occur in 
operation, handling, and transportation. 
. Helium Leak. Detect package or seal defects. 
. Fluid Leak. Detect gross leaks not detectable by helium 
leak test. Devices put in solution of ethylene glycal and 
inspected for bubbles. 
• Radiflo. Radioactive tracer gas is put into device, and the 
rate of leakage is measured by a radiation counter. 
. Moisture-Resistance. Device under varying temperature and 
humidity conditions to check deterioration of seals and 
packaging. 
. Pressure. Evaluate device package and seals and the ability 
of the device to withstand pressure differentials. 
. Ultrasonic. Evaluate bond strength and detect variations 
in the density of materials. 
The electrical nondestructive tests encompass the following: 
. Power (Burn-in). Operating component for long period of time 
at rated conditions to weed out marginal components. 
. Current-noise. Check noise (voltage fluctuation) in resistors 
by passing direct current through them. There is a direct 
relationship between defective resistors and those that are 
noisy. 
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. Infrared scanning. Voids and contamination are revealed as 
hot spots in the component when current is passed through it. 
This technique is used in checking resistors and integrated 
circuits. 
. Thermographic mapping, Evaluates semiconductor devices and 
printed circuit assemblies. Cholesteric compounds (liquid 
crystals) are used to plot hot spots when a component is sub-
jected to changes in temperature environment due to overstressing. 
. Dielectric strength. Sometimes called hi-pot, this test detects 
flaws in insulation or workmanship. 
. Radio frequency noise. Detects poor contact or voids in solder 
joints, splices, or connectors. 
The thermal tests include the following: 
. High temperature storage. Screens parts not capable of high 
temperatures and stabilizes electrical characteristics of 
solid state devices by baking out contaminants and moisture. 
. Temperature cycling. Detects poor connections and bonds, 
inadequate strain relief, and thermal mismatch by exposing 
components to high and low temperatures. 
The following nondestructive test falls under the category of 
visual test: 
. Microscopic examination. Detect imperfections in the component 
before encapsulation. Integrated circuits require BOX magni-
fication inspection while resistors may often be inspected 
with only 10X or 15X magnification. 
The radiographic tests or x-ray radiography detects any foreign 
material, loose particles, solder, and other imperfections in the 
component. 
In designing a nondestructive testing program the failure mode 
of each component must be considered. The application requirements 
must be studied such as parameter drift tolerances, loads, operating 
time, on-off times, radiation, heat oxidizing, pressure, reducing, 
and corrosive environments. The part construction is also an 
important factor - the materials, interfaces, structural elements, 
contamination, process controls, and processes. 
Reliability Program Review  
The reliability program review is basically an evaluation 
procedure used to assure the effectiveness of the reliability program 
for the communication satellite by evaluation of reliability controls 
and procedures. The objectives could be stated as follows: 
. Initiate standard procedures for evaluating the degree and 
effectiveness of reliability controls and practices. 
. To evaluate methods of controlling specific tasks leading 
to reliability improvement and higher safety margins. 
. Identify problems encountered during the reliability phase of 
the program and finding solutions to these problems using the 




The reliability program tasks considered in this thesis 
consisted of the 10 major activity areas, each having a separate 
and distinct relationship to the program. The reliability eval-
uation phase is conducted with the following objectives in mind: 
. To determine if effective coverage for each phase of the 
reliability program is obtained and kept up to date in 
accordance with specified requirements. 
. To find out the weaknesses and strengths in each of the 
reliability tasks that are to be performed throughout the 
program. 
. If there are weaknesses in the reliability tasks, the 
evaluation phase will make necessary recommendations for 
improving and strengthening each task. 
An evaluation of the degree of coverage for each task will now 
be given. The basic steps to follow in the reliability program 
evaluation are stated below. 
Step A. The relative importance (usually in percent) of each 
reliability task is established. 
Step B. The relative importance (from 1 to 10) of the 
individual work elements within each reliability task is then determined. 
Step C. The degree of effective coverage (in percent) of the 
individual work elements is established for each task. 
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Step D. All related specification and requirement numbers for 
each work element are recorded. 
Step E. The functional or departmental responsibility for each 
work element is determined next. 
Step F. A weighted effective rating for each work element is 
found by the product of the relative importance factor (Step A) and 
the degree of effective coverage (Step C). 
Step G. Determine for each work element the need for priority 
and action to be taken by subtracting the weighted effective coverage 
(Step C) from the relative importance factor (Step A). The need is 
greatest when the number obtained is highest. 
Step H. Repeat Steps F and G for each reliability major task. 
Each reliability task has a separate and distinct contribution 
in the communication satellite program. They are not independent of 
each other in that the weakness of one task can have a decided effect 
upon the other tasks of the program. Relative importance factors (Step A) 
must be established for each task. A set of these factors has been 
established as shown in Table 4.8, column A. The work elements of 
each reliability task are given relative importance factors in the 
same way as where given to the major task. It should be noted each 
factor is subject to revision based on experience as the program 
progresses. 
Relative Importance Factor Degree of Effective Coverage (%) 
Weighted Effective Coverage (A)(B) 
Relative Coverage (A-C) Functional Responsibility 
A B C D E 
Reliability Program 
Organization 10 40 4.0 6.0 Rel. 
Reliability Program 
Plan 7 60 4.2 	2.8 Rel. 
Design Review 
Program 18 80 14.4 3.6 Rel. 
Reliability Apportion-
ment, Assessment, and 
Analysis 
10 40 4.0 6.0 Rel. 
Parts, Materials, and 
Process Control 10 80 8.0 2.0 Rel. 
Supplier Reliability 
Control 10 60 6.0 4.0 Rel. 
Failure Reporting and 
Analysis and Corrective 
Action 
13 60 7.8 5.2 Rel. 
Reliability Indoctrina-
tion and Training 10 80 8.0 2.0 Rel. 
Reliability Testing 
Program 12 80 9.6 2.4 Rel. 
TOTAL 100 --- 66.0 --- --- 
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TABLE 4.8 Reliability Program Evaluation Summary  
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In Column B of Table 4.8 is given the degree of effective 
coverage. This coverage rating of each major reliability task 
is based on surveys conducted by program personnel. Coverage 
that is satisfactory is given a rating of 100 percent. 
The weighted effective coverage is given in Column C of 
Table 4.8. This quantity is the product of Column A and Column B. 
When recommending corrective action and need for priority, it 
is necessary to find the lack of coverage for each major task or 
individual work element and to include at the same time the relative 
importance factors for each task or work element. This is accomplished 
by subtracting the weighted effective coverage from the relative 
importance factor (Column C from Column A). This gives Column D 
in Table 4.8. The higher the number in Column D, the greater is 
the need for action. 
Column E is to be filled in to indicate the functional 
responsibility for the task. In this instance Reliability 
Engineering is the responsible function. 
The overall degree of effective coverage for the reliability 
program is established directly from the relative importance factor 
of each task and their associated degree of effective coverage. The 
sum of the weighted effective coverage (Column C) is then totaled 
(in this case 66 percent) and is the percent representing the degree 
of overall program coverage for the reliability phase of the program. 
It should be noted that the numbers used in the evaluation of 
the program were not actual figures but rather figures used for 
illustration purposes only. What was shown was a method that could 
be used in reviewing and evaluating the reliability tasks necessary 
in establishing a high reliable communication satellite. 
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The achievement of communication by means of satellites has 
required the development of many technical innovations. Most 
important was the technique of improving the reliability of each 
system as it was placed in orbit. The use of large spherical 
passive reflectors such as Echo I and II was shown to be feasible 
as a first step in satellite communication. The Echo project 
verified that total communications system calculations agreed with 
theory to within one decibel. The project also demonstrated the 
feasibility of placing large structures into a space environment 
without any detrimental effects. 
The next step in developing a more flexible communication 
operation was the use of the active satellite. Here we see the 
communication capacity of the satellite transponders increased from 
narrowband (teletype, voice, and facsimile) to wideband television, 
or many telephone channels. The design of the transponders has been 
a fruitful arena for the application of a growing field within 
electronics such as the design of very reliable traveling wave tubes, 
tunnel diode amplifiers, components, circuits, and subsystems. 
The initial phase of operational communication satellites has 
left a number of important questions unanswered relating to, namely: 
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. Frequency Allocation 
. Time Delay and Echo 
. Multiple Access 
It is imperative that these questions be resolved in the near 
future to facilitate the resolution of problems which are expected 
in the initial phase. The following discussion is presented to 
provide an appreciation of the factors involved. 
It has been apparent since 1959 that frequency allocation with 
surface systems be mandatory for communication satellites, since the 
1-10 GHz region, which is best suited for space communications, was 
already fully allocated to terrestrial services. Studies conducted 
in the early 1960's concluded that frequency allocation would be 
feasible. In 1963, the International Telecommunications Union 
allocated 2800 MHz of spectrum space for satellite communications 
systems on the basis of sharing with terrestrial systems. Sharing 
criteria are conservative, and further experience may well provide 
a basis for desirable relaxation, desirable since flux densities at 
the earth's surface required for operation of small and inexpensive 
ground terminals are higher than allowed by the present criteria. 
A second technical problem is the time delay inherent in 
synchronous altitude satellite systems in which the round trip 
delay is about 6/10 of a second. This delay by itself is not 
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usually detectable by a telephone user. When terminations are 
imperfect, however, an echo occurs, and acceptability and usability 
of the circuit decreases rapidly with increasing echo amplitude. 
Echo suppressors are used to eliminate the echo, but echo suppressors 
are voice-operated switches and they introduce undesirable side effects. 
The adverse effects of long-delayed echo led to a tentative inter-
national agreement in 1960 that round-trip delays should not exceed 
300 milliseconds. 
Additional laboratory and subjective tests of user reaction to 
time delays and echo were conducted for three years, 1962-1964, but 
with inconclusive results. The last in this group of tests was 
conducted by American Telephone and Telegraph in collaboration with 
Federal Communications Commission, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, and the Communications Satellite Corporation. The 
most important results of these tests were submitted by the United 
States in 1964. Based on these results and on information submitted 
by other administrations, the following limitations on mean one-way 
propagation times when echo sources exist and echo suppressors are 
used was recommended. 
. Acceptable without reservation, 0 to 150 ms. 
. Provisionally acceptable, 150 to 400 ms. In this range, 
connections may be permitted, in particular, when compen-
sating advantages are obtained. 
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. Provisionally unacceptable, 400 ms and higher. Connections 
with these delays should not be used except under exceptional 
circumstances. 
The problem of time delay and echo is not limited to voice 
communications. In fact, the conclusions may well be different when 
considered in connection with high speed data communications, partic-
ularly if automatic error detection, querying, and correction is 
included. Certain high speed automatic signalling and routing systems 
may be sensitive to the amount of delay. 
The successful application of satellite-borne repeaters for 
global telecommunications provides the potential for extending high 
quality telephone communications service to many points now served 
poorly or not at all. However, to realize this potential, a number 
of technical problems must be solved. 
One of the most significant problems is called "multiple access" 
or how to employ a single satellite-borne repeater simultaneously for 
communication among a number of ground stations, each communicating 
with one or more of the others. 
Various methods of modulation and multiplexing can be employed 
to provide a multiple access capability. However, each scheme is 
sensitive to the configuration of the satellite system, the number 
of participating ground stations, the traffic demands of each, and 
the required flexibility of routing. 
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Much has been discussed on the general attributes of the four 
principal categories of multiple access technology (multiple FM 
carriers, SSB in the up-link, time division multiplex, and common 
spectrum). An assessment of their relative merits was also made and 
evidence exists that efforts regarding the problem of multiple access 
will continue until a suitable and successful solution is found. 
The future of satellite communications is very optimistic 
indeed. As the traffic increases in satellite communications systems 
there will be a tendency to install more ground stations to give a 
greater flexibility to service. This greater flexibility could result 
if a higher power satellite could be achieved. The type and capacity 
of the power supply is the greatest factor to be considered in achieving 
this higher power. A power supply developing several kilowatts of 
power for long periods of time is needed. At the present time there 
are two possibilities. One is the use of solar power and the other 
is the utilization of power developed in the nuclear-fission reactor. 
There have been several programs under way for nuclear reactors. These 
programs are known as the SNAP-10A, SNAP-2, and the SNAP-8 and develop 
1, 3, and 30 kilowatts of electric power respectively. The SNAP-8 
can develop 60 kilowatts of power with duel power converters. 
A preliminary design has been made of a nuclear-powered satellite 
vehicle. While a number of difficult design problems have been un-
covered it appears that if sufficient effort is applied to their 
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solution the satellite could be demonstrated in flight in the very 
near future. 
For this preliminary design several decisions were made based 
on experience gained in the design of other satellites that have been 
successfully launched and operated in space: 
. A modular design consisting of a power unit and an electronic 
payload unit appears to be advantageous. This permits design 
of the two units to proceed independently, except for interfaces. 
This is particularly desirable in view of the special handling 
required for nuclear reactors. 
. Heat dissipation is a major problem, and the radiators required 
for this purpose are a major mass item. While the radiators 
could be deployed after launching and continuously orientated 
with respect to the sun to minimize mass this would complicate 
the mechanical design and place additional burdens on the 
orientation system. Thus, it was decided that the vehicle would 
be earth orientated, with the nose up, and that the radiators 
would be integral with the body in both modules to conserve 
structural mass. The resultant simplicity enhances the vehicle 
reliability. 
. The electronics payload module should be as far removed from the 
reactor as possible to reduce radiation flux hazards to a minimum. 
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It has been estimated that the high power communication satellite 
would have a capacity of 27,000 two-way voice channels. There is plenty 
of margin for growth in the traffic since only 6,000 two-way voice 
channels are required of the Atlantic satellite by mid-1970. For this 
type of future service, design for reliability and provisions for 
continuous service are of prime importance. 
From the viewpoint of continuity of service the salient character-
istic of the high-power-satellite-communications system, is that it 
takes about 75 days to place a satellite into operating position. If 
only one non-redundant satellite is at any one of the three stations its 
failure will interrupt service for at least 75 days even if several launch 
pads, boosters and replacement satellites are kept in constant readiness. 
To maintain a sufficiently high probability of uninterrupted service a 
higher order of redundancy in satellites and repeaters must be provided 
at each station. To evaluate this probability quantitatively a 
reliability model of the satellite must first be established. 
It is assumed that each satellite will have a single reactor, but 
that other vital equipment will be at least in duplicate form. The 
present 60 kW SNAP-8 unit already consists of two duplicate 30 kW 
turbine-electric converters, each with its own turbine, electric 
alternator, radiator, pumps and liquid-flow loop. The output of each 
30 kW converter is sufficient for 13,600 two-way voice channels which, 
according to the predictions, will not be reached until about 1980 
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for the Atlantic station. Hence, duplicate power capacity for 
communications purposes is available in each satellite at each 
station. The present SNAP-8 reactor loop contains a heat exchanger, 
to transfer heat to the converter loops, a pump and a pump motor. 
This loop design might be reconfigured to provide for complete 
duplicate loops or to include units whose design permits replacement 
of functions without blocking the entire loop or failure of the entire 
unit. Concerning the electronics equipment, multiple communications 
repeaters and power supplies should present no difficult technical 
problems. Non-rotating microwave plumbing such as waveguides and 
antennae will probably not need any duplication. Antennae are fixed 
to the satellite, presently designed to be three-axis stabilized. The 
station-keeping and attitude-control system will present design problems 
for long life, and a design with duplication of critical components will 
undoubtedly be necessary. The resulting mass penalty is estimated to 
be about 250 lb. Telemetry and control equipment should lend themselves 
to long life or duplication with relatively small mass penalties. It 
is seen that the mass increase from redundant design does not result 
in any major increase in the overall mass distribution, owing primarily 
to two reasons: 
. The major mass increases over a single 30 kW unit are already 
included in the 60 kW SNAP-8 duplicate converter-radiator design. 
. The power capacity is considerably more than twice the 
communications requirement (at least until 1980) which 
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should permit mass-power trade-offs in design. In summary, 
the reliability model specifies two independent communications 
repeater sub-systems per satellite, each capable of handling 
the entire traffic load. 
The results of detailed calculations for the probability of 
continuous service using the reliability model described earlier are 
summarized as follows: 
a. Based upon a reasonable 90 percent probability of successful 
launch and injection into orbit by 1972 and thereafter, the 
overall probability of success of at least one out of three 
such successive attempts is 99.9 percent. This would be 
considered an acceptable risk, whereas one out of two attempts 
would provide a probability of success of 99 percent a marginal 
risk. 
b. Because of (a), at most 225 days must be allocated to replace 
a satellite failure as a result of three successive attempts, 
each up to 75 days in length. This is an upper limit on 
replacement time and provides at least a 99.9 percent confidence 
of replacement. A lower limit (90 percent confidence) on 
replacement time is 75 days for a single attempt. 
c. It is necessary to maintain two satellites at ecah station. 
If only one satellite (two repeaters) is kept on station the 
following risks are incurred (considered to be unacceptable): 
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. A premature or unforeseen failure of the single nuclear 
power supply. 
. Upon failure of one repeater the probability of continuous 
service (non-failure) of the other repeater depends upon 
the repeater mean life (M.T.B.F.). Figure 5.1 shows this 
probability for the curves labelled P
s  (1/1). For an 
M.T.B.F. of 3 years this probability ranges from 81 to 93 
percent for the upper and lower limits established earlier. 
d. When two satellites are on station there are four repeaters, 
one in operation, and three as spares. This provides the 
following levels of confidence in continuous service: 
. Two independent nuclear power supplies are on station, one 
in each satellite. 
. Upon failure of the operating repeater, the probability of 
continuous service during replacement time for an M.T.B.F. 
of 3 years ranges from 99.4 to 99.97 percent. Figure 5.1 
shows this probability, labelled P
s 
 (1/3). This is 
considered to be acceptable. 
Communication by means of satellites has proven to be both feasible 
and reliable over the past decade. To help maintain the required high 
reliability requirements needed for such an undertaking a reliability 
program has been presented. By using the reliability techniques and 
statistical methods as presented, a successful communication satellite 
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FIGURE 5.1 Probability of Survival High-power Communications  
Satellite 
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system could be realized. Reliability must be the prime consideration 
for such a non-maintained system. Reliability must be introduced early 
in the design studies and continued throughout the entire program. As 
was stated previously, reliability cannot be tested into the satellite 
system (more testing does not improve the reliability of the system), 
but it must be designed in the system at the outset. 
In conclusion, it is therefore recommended that the reliability 
considerations set forth in this thesis be followed in detail, thus 
assuring a communication satellite system of successfully completing 
its intended mission for the period of time specified. To cite an 
example of the usefulness of communication satellites the following 
was noted recently. Two existing Atlantic telephone cables broke and 
went out of operation. The odds of this happening are approximately 
1000 to 1. One cable was from New Jersey to St. Hilaire-de-Riez, France 
and the other was from New Jersey to Cornwall, England. Both failures 
occurred off the United States coast. It was the Intelsat communication 
satellites Early Bird and Atlantic II that provided 177 circuits as 
temporary assistance for the transatlantic operation. 
Both of the satellites and satellite earth stations functioned 
precisely as required. It was also noted that the reliability of the 
satellite system during 1967 was outstanding. There were no service 
failures attributable to either satellite. The reliability for 
earth-station operations was 99.37 percent, and the reliability for 
land lines between earth-stations and international switching centers 
was 99.14 percent. 
With the continuation of growth in the techniques and disciplines 
of reliability engineering, the future of more elaborate and complex 
satellites for the purpose of communications is excellent. 
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APPENDIX I  
SATELLITES REMAINING AS A FUNCTION OF TIME  
If satellites having a given mean time to failure and a 
constant failure rate over the lifetime of the system are launched 
at a uniform rate, the average number still functioning at any 
time, is given by (A-1) 
where 
MTF is mean time to failure in months 
µ is reciprocal of MTF or failure rate 
i is the number of launches per month. 
Table A-1 gives N(t) for satellites having two-year mean time 
to failure and a launch rate of one per month. Note that although 
one satellite is launched each month, the number operating does not 
increase by one each month. Specifically, at about two years, the 
number of operating satellites is increasing at a rate of less than 
a half of a satellite per month. It can be shown that the limit of 
this process is a number less than thirty. A-1 represents a geometric 
progression whose sum is given by (A-2). 
where 
a is the first term 
r is the ratio between terms 
n is the number of terms 
Applying this relationship to (A-1): 
In the limit, 
If 30 operating satellites are desired: 
which shows that the minimum mean time to failure must be 29 months. 
If the mean time to failure is taken as 60 months (five years), and 
satellites are launched at the same one-per-month rate, Table A-2 
gives the number operating at any time. Note that it takes 42 months 
to place an average of 30 working satellites in orbit. 
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TABLE A-1  
SATELLITES REMAINING AS A FUNCTION OF TIME 
(MTF = 24 MONTHS) 
i (Months) 
e- µt  Σeµi  
N(t) 
1 0.958 1.04 1.0 
2 0.9198 2.13 2.0 
3 0.883 3.26 2.8 
4 0.8446 4.45 3.8 
5 0.812 5.68 4.8 
6 0.7788 6.96 5.4 
7 0.7468 8.30 6.2 
8 0.716 9.70 6.9 
9 0.687 11.15 7.6 
10 0.659 12.67 8.3 
11 0.632 14.25 9.0 
12 0.6o6 15.90 9.6 
13 0.581 17.62 10.2 
14 0.559 19.41 10.8 
15 0.535 21.28 11.3 
16 0.518 23.21 12.0 
17 0.493 25.24 12.4 
18 0.471 27.36 12.9 
19 0.453 29.57 13.4 
20 0.435 31.87 13.9 
21 0.416 34.27 14.3 
22 0.400 36.77 14.7 
23 0.384 39.38 15.1 
24 0.368 42.10 15.5 
25 0.352 44.94 15.8 
26 0.338 47.90 16.2 
27 0.324 50.98 16.5 
28 0.310 54.20 16.8 
29 0.298 57.56 17.1 
30 0.286 61.05 17.5 
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TABLE A- II 
SATELLITES REMAINING AS A FUNCTION OF TIME  
(MTF 60 MONTHS)  
1 (Months) 
e-µt  Σeµi 
 N(t) 
1 0.985 1.02 1.00 
2 0.97 2.05 1.99 
3 0.953 3.10 2.95 
4 0.937 4.17 3.9 
5 0.92 5.26 4.8 
6 0.905 6.36 5.8 
7 0.89 7.48 6.6 
8 0.875 8.62 7.5 
9 0.861 9.78 8.4 
10 0.845 10.96 9.26 
11 0.832 12.16 10.1 
12 0.818 13.38 10.9 
13 0.806 14.62 11.8 
114. 0.792 15.88 12.6 
15 0.779 17.16 13,4 
16 0.766 18.47 14.2 
17 0.754 19.80 14.9 
18 0.741 21.15 15.7 
19 0.729 22.52 16.4 
20 0.717 23.91 17.1 
21 0.705 25.33 17.9 
22 0.694 26,77 18.6 
23 0.684 28.24 19.3 
24 0.670 29.73 19.9 
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TABLE A-II (Continued)  
1 (Months) 
e- µt 
 Σeµi  N(t) 
25 0.660 31.25 20.6 
26 0.648 32.79 21.2 
27 0.638 34.36 21.9 
28 0.627 35.95 22.5 
29 0.617 37.57 23.2 
30 0.607 39.22 23.8 
31 0.597 40.89 24.4 
32 0.587 42.59 25.0 
33 0.577 44.32 25.6 
34 0.568 46.08 26.2 
35 0.558 47.87 26.7 
36 0.549 49.69 27.3 
37 0.541 51.54 27.9 
38 0.532 53.42 28.4 
39 0.521 55.34 28.8 
40 0.513 57.29 29.4 
41 0.505 59.27 29.9 
42 0.497 61.28 30.4 
43 0.488 63.33 30.9 
44 0.48 65.41 31.4 
45 0.472 67.53 31.9 
46 0.465 69.68 32.4 
47 0.456 71.87 32.8 
48 0,448 74,10 33.2 
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